The Court has failed to offer even a plausible explanation why illegality of residence, in this country is not a factor that may legitimately bear upon the bona fides of state residence and entitlement to the benefits of lawful residence. This exacting standard of review has been reserved for instances in which a "fundamental" constitutional right or a "suspect" classification is present. at 454-458, concluding that § 21.031 was "constitutionally infirm regardless of whether it was tested using the mere rational basis standard or some more stringent test," id.

who are lawfully within the state and those who are unlawfully there. ", And, only recently, this Court made clear that a State has a legitimate interest in protecting and preserving the quality of its schools and "the right of its own bona fide residents to attend such institutions on a preferential tuition basis." No State may independently exercise a like power. Brown v. Board of Education. The right to an education, in contrast, is a social benefit of relevance to a substantial number of those affected by Texas' statutory scheme, as is discussed below. Although the analogy is not perfect, our holding today does find support in decisions of this Court with respect to the status of illegitimates. In the end, we are told little more than that the level of scrutiny employed to strike down the Texas law applies only when illegal alien children are deprived of a public education, see ante at 457 U. S. 223-224. A legislature must have substantial latitude to establish classifications that roughly approximate the nature of the problem perceived, that accommodate competing concerns both public and private, and that account for limitations on the practical ability of the State to remedy every ill. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms. . to enter the United States and, as the record makes clear, an unknown percentage of them will remain here.

The Court has traditionally shown great deference to federal authority over immigration and to federal classifications based upon alienage. at 578.

Texas might rationally conclude that more significant "demographic or economic problem[s]," ante at 457 U. S. 228, are engendered by the illegal entry into the State of entire families of aliens for indefinite periods than by the periodic sojourns of single adults who intend to leave the State after short-term or seasonal employment. The Court makes no attempt to disguise that it is acting to make up for Congress' lack of "effective leadership" in dealing with the serious national problems caused by the influx of uncountable millions of illegal aliens across our borders. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 411 U. S. 301 (1973); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56, 405 U. S. 73-74 (1972). . I use the term "citizen" advisedly. See 426 U.S. at 426 U. S. 84-86. It would, of course, be most difficult for the State to justify a denial of education to a child enjoying an inchoate federal permission to remain. Indeed, any attempt to do so would involve the State in the administration of the immigration laws. [Footnote 11] Our cases applying the Equal Protection Clause reflect the same territorial theme: [Footnote 12], "Manifestly, the obligation of the State to give the protection of equal laws can be performed only where its laws operate, that is, within its own jurisdiction. 411 U.S. at 411 U. S. 34, n. 74. Plyler v. Doe. To the contrary, each aspect of the Fourteenth Amendment reflects an elementary limitation on state power. Yet by patching together bits and pieces of what might be termed quasi-suspect-class and quasi-fundamental-rights analysis, the Court spins out a theory custom-tailored to the facts of these cases. Apart from the asserted state prerogative to act against undocumented children solely on the basis of their undocumented status -- an asserted prerogative that carries only minimal force in the circumstances of these cases -- we discern three colorable state interests that might support § 21.031. The court determined that the State's concern for fiscal integrity was not a compelling state interest, id. Furthermore, the law permitted local schools to deny such students access to the school. The conclusion reflected the longstanding distinction between exclusion proceedings, involving the determination of admissibility, and deportation proceedings. But in the area of special constitutional sensitivity presented by these cases, and in the absence of any contrary indication fairly discernible in the present legislative record, we perceive no national policy that supports the State in denying these children an elementary education. . These considerations, combined with doubts about the judiciary's ability to make fine distinctions in assessing the effects of complex social policies, led the Court in Rodriguez to articulate a firm rule: fundamental rights are those that "explicitly or implicitly [are] guaranteed by the Constitution." We are unable to uphold § 21.031 on that basis. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U. S. 410, 334 U. S. 419 (1948). condemnation on the head of an infant" for the misdeeds of the parents is illogical, unjust, and "contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. The Constitution does not provide a cure for every social ill, nor does it vest judges with a mandate to try to remedy every social problem. Appellees "lack control" over their illegal residence in this country in the same sense as lawfully resident children lack control over the school district in which their parents reside.

In that case, the Court held, as a matter of statutory construction, that an alien paroled into the United States pursuant to 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. The court contrasted this group with those illegal aliens who entered the country alone in order to earn money to send to their dependents in Mexico, and who, in many instances, remained in this country for only a short period of time. An illegal entrant might be granted federal permission to continue to reside in this country, or even to become a citizen. But we have also recognized the fundamentality of participation in state "elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction," Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 405 U. S. 336 (1972), even though "the right to vote, per se, is not a constitutionally protected right."