O'CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 658. United States v. Muse, 633 F.2d 1041 (CA2 1980) (en bane); United States v. Hay, 527 F.2d 990, 994, and n. 4 (CAlO 1975); cf. These explanations notwithstanding, we have on occasion identified the prevention of prejudice to the defense as an independent and fundamental objective of the Speedy Trial Clause. similar ends. Douglas Driver, the Drug Enforcement 906 F. 2d, at 582. While such presumptive prejudice cannot Of these forms of prejudice, "the most serious is the last, because the inability of

Should a mandatory requirement of actual prejudice be imposed in order for the accused to prevail on a claim that his right to a speedy trial has been violated? such presumptive prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria, see Loud Hawk, supra, at 315, it is part of the mix of relevant facts, and its importance increases with the length of delay. See Barker, supra, at 530. The Court held that the trial court's failure to "have the jurors interrogated on the issue of racial bias" violated the petitioner's due process right under the Fourteenth Amendment. excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability "Although the delay between indictment and trial was lengthy, [the] petitioner did not suffer any anxiety or restriction on his liberty." Our cases, however, have qualified the literal sweep of the provision by specifically recognizing the relevance of four separate enquiries: whether delay before trial was uncommonly long, whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay, whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and whether he suffered prejudice as the delay's result. reason, eluded the DEA, and Agent Driver assumed for trial . While the United States argued essentially that a defendant's speedy trial rights cannot be violated where he is neither incarcerated nor subject to the anxiety of known criminal charges, it did not claim that this was invariably so. 906 F.2d 573 (CAll 1990). The negligence caused delay six times as long as that generally deemed sufficient to trigger judicial review, and the presumption of prejudice is neither extenuated, as by Doggett's acquiescence, nor persuasively rebutted. His mother told the officers that he had left for Colombia four days earlier. See, e. g., United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149, 1156-1157, and n. 5 (CA2 1979), modified on other grounds sub nom. From this the Magistrate implicitly concluded, Magistrate's Report, reprinted at App. . Driver would not learn of Doggett's travels to Colombia until he was reassigned to Colombia in 1985; he presumed that Doggett had settled in Colombia and (possibly believing that Colombia would also, like Panama, not agree to extradite Doggett) made no effort to track him down.

THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and SCALIA, J., joined, post, p. 659. Doggett's travels abroad had not wholly escaped the Government's notice, however . 90-857. uncommonly feeble interest in bringing an accused to Doggett was living abroad, and, had they done so, they In this case, we consider whether the delay of 8 1/2 years between petitioner's indictment and arrest violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.

Barker stressed that official bad faith in causing delay will be weighed heavily against the government, 407 U. S., at 531, and a bad-faith delay the length of this negligent one would present an overwhelming case for dismissal. Doggett then entered a conditional guilty plea under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2), expressly reserving the right to appeal, We have long identified the "major evils" against which the Speedy Trial Clause is directed as "undue and oppressive incarceration" and the "anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation.".

. The district court adopted the magistrate's recommendation and denied Doggett's motion. 407 U.S., at 532. Upon learning of Doggett's actions, in an attempt to arrest Doggett upon his return, Driver notified the United States Customs stations and several law enforcement agencies, as well as posting Doggett's info on the Treasury Enforcement Communication System (the TECS info expired in September 1980 and was not re-entered). In this regard, it is instructive to compare the Sixth Amendment's speedy trial right to its right to counsel, which also applies only to an "accused." Once the DEA discovered that he had left Panama for Colombia, it made no further attempt to locate him. The defendant in, Depending on the nature of the charges, the lower courts have generally found post-accusation delay "presumptively prejudicial," at least as it approaches one year. Second, the Government was to blame for the delay. on adjudicative accuracy is exclusively a matter for consideration under Driver never asked DEA officials in Panama to check into Doggett's status, and only after his own fortuitous assignment to that country in 1985 did he discover Doggett's departure for Colombia.

Loud Hawk, supra, at 312. He naturally moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the Government's failure to prosecute him earlier violated his Sixth Amendmentright to a speedy trial. Cf.

Doggett's speedy trial motion, it introduced no evidence . While the Government ably counters Doggett's efforts to demonstrate To be sure, to warrant granting relief, negligence unaccompanied by particularized trial prejudice must have The Government goes against the record again in suggesting that Doggett knew of his indictment years before he was arrested. The negligence caused delay six times as long as that generally deemed sufficient to trigger judicial review, and the presumption of prejudice is neither extenuated, as by Doggett's acquiescence, nor persuasively rebutted. Driver then simply assumed Doggett had settled there, and he made no effort to find out for sure or to track Doggett down, either abroad or in the United States. In so arguing, the Government asks us, in effect, to read part of Barker right out of the law, and that we will not do. other words, for purposes of the right to counsel, an "accused" must in fact be accused of a crime; unlike the speedy trial right, it does not attach upon arrest. We leave intact our earlier observation, see United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 7 (1982), that a defendant may invoke due process to challenge delay both before and after official accusation. The District Court's finding that the Government was negligent in pursuing Doggett should be viewed with considerable deference, and neither the Government nor the record provides any reason to reject that finding. These statutes refute the notion that our society ever has recognized any general right of criminals to repose. one hand, and bad-faith conduct, on the other. The Magistrate found that the delay between Doggett's indictment and arrest was long enough to be "presumptively prejudicial," Magistrate's Report, reprinted at App. Barker, 407 U.S., at 532; see also Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 377-379 (1969); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966). CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, No.

United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971). That would, of course, convert the Speedy Trial Clause into a constitutional statute of limitations-a result with no basis in the text or history of the Clause or in our precedents. I fear that danger has been realized here. But the major evils protected against by the speedy trial guarantee exist quite apart from actual or possible prejudice to an accused's defense."

This latter enquiry is significant to the speedy trial analysis because, as we discuss below, the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifies over time.

2 Record, Exh.

But Barker's factors now appear to have taken on a life of their own. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court involving the application of the right of to confront accusers in state court proceedings. Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81 (2009), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court which ruled that when appointed counsel is responsible for delays in criminal proceedings, these delays are ordinarily attributable to the defendants they represent when conducting speedy trial analysis under Barker v. Wingo. Thus Doggett remained lost to the American criminal justice system until September, 1988, when the Marshal's Service ran a simple credit check on several thousand people subject to outstanding arrest warrants and, within minutes, found out where Doggett lived and worked. That is, in itself, a regrettable development, for the law draws force from the clarity of its command and the certainty of its application. The cases linked on your profile facilitate Casemine's artificial intelligence engine in recommending you to potential clients who might be interested in availing your services for similar matters. .

pretrial detention nor, he has successfully contended, to

Criminal procedure in South Africa refers to the adjudication process of that country's criminal law. 114-115. to Pet. Therefore, I see no basis for the Court's conclusion that Doggett is entitled to relief under the Speedy Trial Clause simply because the Government was negligent in prosecuting him, and because the resulting delay may have prejudiced his defense. To hold that a speedy trial claim can succeed without a showing of actual trial prejudice is not, of course, to hold that such a claim can succeed without a showing of any prejudice at all.

ture for Colombia. Our constitutional law has become ever more complex in recent decades. On September 25, 1982, he passed unhindered through Customs in New York City and settled down in Virginia.

guished. But even so, the Government's egregious persistence in failing to prosecute Doggett is clearly sufficient. Whenever a criminal trial takes place long after the events at issue, the defendant may be prejudiced in any number of ways. To recognize a constitutional right to repose is to recognize a right to be tried speedily after the offense. The federal magistrate (using the factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo ) agreed with Doggett that the length of the delay was long enough to be "presumptively prejudicial", that the delay "clearly [was] attributable to the negligence of the government", "and that Doggett could not be faulted for any delay in asserting his right to a speedy trial, there being no evidence that he had known of the charges against him until his arrest". of Oral Arg. . See Loud Hawk, supra, at 315-317. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 377-379 (1969); United States v. While not. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor dissented, arguing that the possibility of prejudice is not enough to prove that the right to a speedy trial has been violated. Get 2 points on providing a valid reason for the above Doggett was neither in United States custody nor subject to bail during the entire 8 1/2 year period at issue. L.

While not compelling relief in every case where bad-faith delay would make relief virtually automatic, neither is negligence automatically tolerable simply because the accused cannot demonstrate exactly how it has prejudiced him.

The United States Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in 1991.

The Magistrate also found, however, that Doggett had made no affirmative showing that the delay had impaired his ability to mount a successful defense or had otherwise prejudiced him.

For the issue here is not simply whether the relevant language from Barker should be read out of the law, but whether that language trumps the contrary logic of Marion, MacDonald, and Loud Hawk. 63, p. 2. I would disregard the concession, for much the same reasons that we sometimes consider an argument that a litigant has waived. to Pet. Our cases, however, have qualified the

taxed for invoking his speedy trial right only after his