.

Footnote 13 Any society adopting such a system would be courting anarchy, but that danger increases in direct proportion to the society's diversity of religious beliefs, and its determination to coerce or suppress none of them. § 13-3402(B)(1) (3) (1989); Colo.Rev.Stat. . at 310 U. S. 303. The compelling interest test effectuates the First Amendment's command that religious liberty is an independent liberty, that it occupies a preferred position, and that the Court will not permit encroachments upon this liberty, whether direct or indirect, unless required by clear and compelling governmental interests "of the highest order," Yoder, supra, 406 U.S. at 406 U. S. 215. Any person who manufactures peyote for or distributes peyote to the Native American Church, however, is required to obtain registration annually and to comply with all other requirements of law"); see Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 279 U.S.App.D.C. Bowen v. Roy, supra, 476 U.S. at 476 U. S. 708 (opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by Powell and REHNQUIST, JJ.). .

We noted, however, that the Oregon Supreme Court had not decided whether respondents' sacramental use of peyote was in fact proscribed by Oregon's controlled substance law, and that this issue was a matter of dispute between the parties.

This Court over the years painstakingly has developed a consistent and exacting standard to test the constitutionality of a state statute that burdens the free exercise of religion. Unemployment benefits are not available to individuals who are terminated from their jobs because of related misconduct. It is permissible for States to exempt religious peyote use from their criminal laws (as some States have done), but it is not constitutionally required. Indeed, the words of Justice Jackson in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette (overruling Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586 (1940)) are apt: "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. See State v. Whittingham, 19 Ariz.App. U.S. 707 . . Therefore, a less restrictive way to criminalize peyote, yet still satisfy the First Amendment, is to allow for a religious exception. See Ashwander v. TVA, .'"

Perhaps more puzzling than the imagined ambiguity is the Court's silence as to its relevance. This means, presumably, that compelling interest scrutiny must be applied to generally applicable laws that regulate or prohibit any religiously motivated activity, no matter how unimportant to the claimant's religion. 327, 330-331 (1969) ("The purpose of almost any law can be traced back to one or another of the fundamental concerns of government: public health and safety, public peace and order, defense, revenue.

Even if peyote use is a crime in Oregon, since the State does not administer its unemployment compensation program for law enforcement purposes, they conclude that our decisions in Sherbert and Thomas require that they be awarded benefits. Respondents applied for and were denied unemployment compensation by petitioner Employment Division under an Oregon statute disqualifying employees discharged for work-connected misconduct. (1963), and Thomas v. Review Bd., Indiana Employment Security Div., Justia makes no guarantees or warranties that the annotations are accurate or reflect the current state of law, and no annotation is intended to be, nor should it be construed as, legal advice. This was a rare occasion on which the Court ruled for a state against an individual appealing a denial of public benefits under the Free Exercise Clause. The only difference between the cases before us and the situations we faced in Sherbert, Thomas, and Hobbie is that here the Employment Division has asserted in court a "`compelling state interest . Respondents also note that the sacramental use of peyote is central to the tenets of the Native American Church, but I agree with the Court, ante at 494 U. S. 886-887, that because "[i]t is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith," Hernandez, supra, at 494 U. S. 699, our determination of the constitutionality of Oregon's general criminal prohibition cannot, and should not, turn on the centrality of the particular. at 10, 878 F.2d at 1467 ("The Administrator [of DEA] finds that . The compelling interest test reflects the First Amendment's mandate of preserving religious liberty to the fullest extent possible in a pluralistic society. Clearly, there is no epidemic of peyote use.

Holding that the denials violated respondents' First Amendment free exercise rights, the State Court of Appeals reversed. Ante at 494 U. S. 884. and Supp. Although we have sometimes purported to apply the Sherbert test in contexts other than that, we have always found the test satisfied, see United States v. Lee, 455 U. S. 252 (1982); Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S. 437 (1971).

The State Court of Appeals reversed. (1987), we reaffirmed Sherbert's holding that, where the "`state .

But the "exercise of religion" often involves not only belief and profession but the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts: assembling with others for a worship service, participating in sacramental use of bread and wine, proselytizing, abstaining from certain foods or certain modes of transportation. . Id.

. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, ordering that the employees were entitled to the unemployment benefits. ", Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. at 490 U. S. 699. And, when the interests of parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim of the nature revealed by this record, more than merely a 'reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State' is required to sustain the validity of the State's requirement under the First Amendment.". 1-6, n. 4, 878 F.2d 1458, 1463, n. 4 (medical and research uses of marijuana). 475.005 et seq.

These cases must be remanded to the State Supreme Court for a definitive ruling as to whether the religious use of peyote is legal is Oregon, since that question is relevant to the federal constitutional analysis. Although this does not prove that Oregon must have such an exception too, it is significant that these States, and the Federal Government, all find their (presumably compelling) interests in controlling the use of dangerous drugs compatible with an exemption for religious use of peyote. As we recently noted, drug abuse is "one of the greatest problems affecting the health and welfare of our population" and thus "one of the most serious problems confronting our society today." Respondents argue that, even though exemption from generally applicable criminal laws need not automatically be extended to religiously motivated actors, at least the claim for a. religious exemption must be evaluated under the balancing test set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963). . As to each of them the violation consisted of a single act of ingesting a small quantity of peyote for sacramental purposes at a ceremony of the Native American Church. The State proclaims an interest in protecting the health and safety of its citizens from the dangers of unlawful drugs. ] The Oregon Supreme Court stated in Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Ore. 611, 614, 625 P.2d 123, 126 (1981): [ ] In Sherbert v. Verner, the appellant was discharged because she would not work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith. [485 In any case, dispensing with a "centrality" inquiry is utterly unworkable. . It is difficult to deny that a law that prohibits. That test was developed in a context -- unemployment compensation eligibility rules -- that lent itself to individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct. 4 In the paragraph that this Court quotes at length, ante, at 666, the Oregon Supreme Court could scarcely have been clearer. He has merely substituted for the question "How important is X to the religious adherent?"

It is undisputed that respondents are members of that church and that their religious beliefs are sincere.

at 406 U. S. 238 (WHITE, J., concurring opinion). Ante at 494 U. S. 882. [Footnote 2/4] The factual findings of other courts cast doubt on the State's assumption that religious use of peyote is harmful.