See ante, at 17. It therefore followed, in the District Court’s opinion, that “[b]ecause plaintiffs’ alleged injury in this case relates to their statewide representation, . Our first consideration of a partisan gerrymandering claim came in Gaffney v. Cummings, 3:15-cv-00421, entered January 27, 2017, amended February 22, 2017, and corrected March 15, 2017, is stayed pending disposition of the appeal in this Court. But when the harm alleged is not district specific, the proof needed for standing should not be district specific either. Brief amicus curiae of the Legacy Foundation filed.

(Distributed), Brief amicus curiae of Common Cause filed. And a plaintiff’s remedy must be “limited to the inadequacy that produced [his] injury in fact.” Lewis v. Casey, At argument on appeal in this case, counsel for the plaintiffs argued that this Court can address the problem of partisan gerrymandering because it must: The Court should exercise its power here because it is the “only institution in the United States” capable of “solv[ing] this problem.” Tr. That shortcoming confirms the fundamental problem with the plaintiffs’ case as presented on this record. On that basis, Judge Griesbach would have entered judgment for the defendants. The Wisconsin Constitution provides that after each census the legislature must redraw the district boundaries, which are used to elect members of the State’s legislature. Eighteen years later, we revisited the issue in Vieth v. Jubelirer, And in many more districts, dispersed throughout the State, the mapmakers cracked Democratic voters—spreading them sufficiently thin to prevent them from electing their preferred candidates. Brief of appellant Beverly R.Gill, et al. Indeed, the need for judicial review is at its most urgent in these cases. As he explained, “[t]he only practical way to accomplish my policy objectives is to get a majority of the Democrats in the Assembly and the Senate ideally in order to get the legislative product I prefer.” Id., at 33. 530 U. S. 567, 574 (2000)). 34–36, Complaint ¶¶20, 23, 24, 26. Of course, the court below and others like it are currently debating, without guidance from this Court, what elements make up a vote dilution claim in the partisan gerrymandering context. Whitford testified that he had nevertheless suffered a harm “relate[d] to [his] ability to engage in campaign activity to achieve a majority in the Assembly and the Senate.” Ibid. It concluded that Act 43 “prevent[ed] Wisconsin Democrats from being able to translate their votes into seats as effectively as Wisconsin Republicans,” and that “Wisconsin Democrats, therefore, have suffered a personal injury to their Equal Protection rights.” Ibid. Id., at 921, 924. See ante, at 14–17. The District Court enjoined the defendants from using the Act 43 map in future elections and ordered them to have a remedial districting plan in place no later than November 1, 2017. That harm arises from the particular composition of the voter’s own district, which causes his vote—having been packed or cracked—to carry less weight than it would carry in another, hypothetical district. In a relatively few districts, the mapmakers packed supermajorities of Democratic voters—well beyond the number needed for a Democratic candidate to prevail. A plaintiff who complains of gerrymandering, but who does not live in a gerrymandered district, “assert[s] only a generalized grievance.” Claims that their votes have been diluted require revising only such districts as are necessary to reshape the voter’s district. 518 U. S. 343, 357 (1996). So when she shows that her district has been packed or cracked, she proves, as she must to establish standing, that she is “among the injured.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, But our cases to date have not found that this presents an individual and personal injury of the kind required for Article III standing.

Understanding sales enablement and your road to success; Aug. 20, 2020. . 504 U. S. 555, 560, and n. 1. The dilution of their votes is both personal and acute.” Id., at 930. We stayed the District Court’s judgment and postponed consideration of our jurisdiction. Motion of Wisconsin State Senate and Wisconsin State Assembly for leave to participate in oral argument as amici curiae and for divided argument filed. It is because the Court views the harm alleged as vote dilution that it (rightly) insists that each plaintiff show packing or cracking in her own district to establish her standing. 504 U. S. 555, 563 (1992) (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton,

507 U. S. 146, 153–154 (1993) (explaining that packing or cracking can also support racial vote dilution claims). Of course, such practices invariably affect more than one citizen at a time. Pp. What, he asked when championing the Constitution, would make the House of Representatives work? Because a plaintiff can have that complaint without living in a packed or cracked district, she need not show what the Court demands today for a vote dilution claim. It held that the voters bringing the suit had not proved that they would be denied representation, only that they would be represented by Republican officials. Contacting Justia or any attorney through this site, via web form, email, or otherwise, does not create an attorney-client relationship. First Amendment concerns arise” when a State purposely “subject[s] a group of voters or their party to disfavored treatment.” 541 U. S., at 314.
Members of the Wisconsin Legislature are elected from single-member legislative districts. The plaintiffs named several members of the state election commission as defendants in the action. After the 2010 census, the legislature passed Act 43. Cf.

(Distributed), Brief amici curiae of Heather K. Gerken, et al. At the close of evidence, the District Court concluded—over the dissent of Judge Griesbach—that the plaintiffs had proved a violation of the First and The plaintiffs argue that their legal injury also extends to the statewide harm to their interest “in their collective representation in the legislature,” and in influencing the legislature’s overall “composition and policymaking.” Brief for Appellees 31. In this case the remedy that is proper and sufficient lies in the revision of the boundaries of the individual’s own district. The state legislators tell a similar story. The congressional brief describes a “cascade of negative results” from excessive partisan gerrymandering: indifference to swing voters and their views; extreme political positioning designed to placate the party’s base and fend off primary challenges; the devaluing of negotiation and compromise; and the impossibility of reaching pragmatic, bipartisan solutions to the nation’s problems. 369 U. S. 186, 204. Brief amicus curiae of The Wisconsin Institute for Law and Liberty filed. 369 U. S. 186, 206 (1962); see ante, at 15. 812 0 obj <>/Filter/FlateDecode/ID[<8262EE733238594EA45C67FD483A5240>]/Index[795 26]/Info 794 0 R/Length 85/Prev 190860/Root 796 0 R/Size 821/Type/XRef/W[1 2 1]>>stream Ibid. And in particular, “[s]uch evidence is perfectly relevant” to showing that mapmakers had an invidious “motive” in drawing the lines of “multiple districts in the State.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 10). Partisan gerrymandering, as this Court has recognized, is “incompatible with democratic principles.” Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (slip op., at 1) (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, Times, Dec. 5, 2015). A three-judge panel of the District Court, see Regarding standing, the court held that the plaintiffs had suffered a particularized injury to their equal protection rights. Id., at 312. Id., at 272–273 (plurality opinion) (brackets omitted). I am hopeful we will then step up to our responsibility to vindicate the Constitution against a contrary law. In the District Court’s view, the plaintiffs “identif[ied] their injury as not simply their inability to elect a representative in their own districts, but also their reduced opportunity to be represented by Democratic legislators across the state.” Whitford v. Nichol, 151 F. Supp. I also write separately because I think the plaintiffs may have wanted to do more than present a vote dilution theory. I do not join Part III, which gives the plaintiffs another chance to prove their standing on remand. Pp. The plaintiffs might then receive exactly the relief sought in this case. filed. That opinion “leave[s] for another day consideration of other possible theories of harm not presented here and whether those theories might present justiciable claims giving rise to statewide remedies.” Ante, at 16. The larger the number produced by that calculation, the greater the asymmetry between the parties in their efficiency in converting votes into legislative seats. See Brief for Political Science Professors as Amici Curiae 28. It arises when an election practice—most commonly, the drawing of district lines—devalues one citizen’s vote as compared to others.

Ibid. As a result, the Republican leadership developed a voting district map that its drafters calculated would allow Republicans to maintain a majority under In the District Court, the plaintiffs’ case rested largely on a particular measure of partisan asymmetry—the “efficiency gap” of wasted votes. Cf. Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, agreed that a plaintiff alleging unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering should proceed on a district-by-district basis, as “we would be able to call more readily on some existing law when we defined what is suspect at the district level.” See id., at 346–347. Plaintiffs who complain of racial gerrymandering in their State cannot sue to invalidate the whole State’s legislative districting map; such complaints must proceed “district-by-district.” Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (slip op., at 6). Brief amici curiae of States of Texas, et al. The S curve for the map that was eventually adopted projected that “Republicans would maintain a majority under any likely voting scenario,” with Democrats needing 54% of the statewide vote to secure a majority in the legislature. Justice Anthony Kennedy, however, wrote in his concurring opinion (which provided the deciding fifth vote for the judgment) that the Court should rule narrowly in this case that no appropriate judicial solution could be found, but not give up on finding one eventually.
478 U. S. 109 (1986). For example, our original one-person, one-vote cases considered how malapportioned maps “contract[ed] the value” of urban citizens’ votes while “expand[ing]” the value of rural citizens’ votes. Standing, we have long held, “turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted.” Warth v. Seldin, In such cases, a voter living in an overpopulated district suffered “disadvantage to [herself] as [an] individual[ ]”: Her vote counted for less than the votes of other citizens in her State. The Court departs from our usual practice because this is supposedly “not the usual case.” Ante, at 21. (Distributed), Brief amici curiae of California Citizens Redistricting Commission, et al. Gerrymandering is a sly method used by state officials to draw voting districts so they can influence election results. The Court’s constitutionally prescribed role is to vindicate the individual rights of the people appearing before it.