DiCostanzo only then informed J. D. B. that he could refuse to answer the investigator's questions and that he was free to leave.2 Asked whether he understood, J. D. B. nodded and provided further detail, including information about the location of the stolen items. Suppose the police learn (or should have learned, see ante, at 11) that a suspect they wish to question is a recent immigrant from a country in which dire consequences often befall any person who dares to attempt to cut short any meeting with the police.9 Is this really less relevant than the fact that a suspect is a month or so away from his 18th birthday?
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And today's holding is not needed to protect the constitutional rights of minors who are questioned by the police. 's grandmother.

See Tr. As recognized by the United States Supreme Court, children “‘generally are less mature and responsible than adults’” (J.D.B. Then, bit by bit, Miranda will lose the clarity and ease of application that has long been viewed as one of its chief justifications. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that a state-court decision omitting any mention of the defendant's age was not unreasonable under AEDPA's deferential standard of review where the defendant "was almost 18 years old at the time of his interview"); post, at 17 (suggesting that "teenagers nearing the age of majority" are likely to react to an interrogation as would a "typical 18-year-old in similar circumstances"). B.

Yet the Miranda custody standard has never accounted for the personal characteristics of these or any other individual defendants. Benchmark. And unless the Miranda custody rule is now to be radically transformed into one that takes into account the wide range of individual characteristics that are relevant in determining whether a confession is voluntary, the Court must shoulder the burden of explaining why age is different from these other personal characteristics. Like this Court's own generalizations, the legal disqualifications placed on children as a class--e.g., limitations on their ability to alienate property, enter a binding contract enforceable against them, and marry without parental consent--exhibit the settled understanding that the differentiating characteristics of youth are universal.6. DiCostanzo pressed J. D. B. for additional detail about his efforts to obtain work; asked J. D. B. to explain a prior incident, when one of the victims returned home to find J. D. B. behind her house; and confronted J. D. B. with the stolen camera.

Rather than demarcate a limited set of relevant circumstances, we have required police officers and courts to "examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation," Stansbury, 511 U. S., at 322, including any circumstance that "would have affected how a reasonable person" in the suspect's position "would perceive his or her freedom to leave," id., at 325.
See App. P. 18. How about the suspect's cultural background? Napa Valley Vintners described the 2013 growing season as ‘early, even and excellent,’ reflecting once again the consistent quality for which this region is known.Not only were we blessed with warm, moderate temperatures lending to slow and balanced ripening, but we also enjoyed above-average yields throughout the region. When the bell rang indicating the end of the schoolday, J. D. B. was allowed to leave to catch the bus home.

I do not endorse any of the ads appearing in my posts. Despite the supposed significance of this distinction, however, at oral argument counsel for the State suggested without hesitation that at least some undeniably personal characteristics--for instance, whether the individual being questioned is blind--are circumstances relevant to the custody analysis. By its very nature, custodial police interrogation entails "inherently compelling pressures." No less than other facets of Miranda, the threshold requirement that the suspect be in "custody" is "designed to give clear guidance to the police." 's family life. is different." See, e.g., Stansbury, 511 U. S., at 325. The court described the sequence of events set forth in the text. 's public defender moved to suppress his statements and the evidence derived therefrom, arguing that suppression was necessary because J. D. B. had been "interrogated by police in a custodial setting without being afforded Miranda warning[s]," App.

Judges "simply need the common sense," the Court assures, "to know that a 7-year-old is not a 13-year-old and neither is an adult." For example, in Berkemer v. McCarty, supra, police officers conducting a traffic stop questioned a man who had been drinking and smoking marijuana before he was pulled over. As has often been recognized, this gain in clarity and administrability is one of Miranda's "principal advantages."

and this inability continues, in contemplation of law, until the infant has attained the age of [21]"); 1 Blackstone *465 ("It is generally true, that an infant can neither aliene his lands, nor do any legal act, nor make a deed, nor indeed any manner of contract, that will bind him"); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U. S. 551, 569 (2005) ("In recognition of the comparative immaturity and irresponsibility of juveniles, almost every State prohibits those under 18 years of age from voting, serving on juries, or marrying without parental consent"). .

Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, JJ., joined. A California court in Beheler had nonetheless distinguished Mathiason because the police knew that Beheler "had been drinking earlier in the day" and was "emotionally distraught." I served my RFP on 10/5. See Brief for Petitioner 5; Brief for Respondent 5.

But with this flexibility came a decrease in both certainty and predictability, and the voluntariness standard proved difficult "for law enforcement officers to conform to, and for courts to apply in a consistent manner." Miranda frequently requires judges to blind themselves to the reality that many un-Mirandized custodial confessions are "by no means involuntary" or coerced. See id., at 670-671, 686 S. E. 2d, at 139. See Brief for Petitioner 16-17 (citing statutes that require or permit parents to be present during custodial interrogation of a minor, that require minors to be advised of a statutory right to communicate with a parent or guardian, and that require parental consent to custodial interrogation). The opinion concluded that a typical "traffic stop" is akin to a "Terry stop"7 and does not qualify as the equivalent of "formal arrest." ; see also ibid., n. 33.10. See Alvarado, supra, at 666. See Crooker v. California, 357 U. S. 433, 440 (1958), overruled by Miranda, supra, at 479, and n. 48. Ante, at 11 (citing Restatement (Third) of Torts §10, Comment b, p. 117 (2005)). The requests set forth are relevant as evidence by the fact that plaintiff saw fit to allege its existence in its complaint. When this custodial threshold is reached, Miranda warnings must precede police questioning. Each alleged one count of larceny and one count of breaking and entering. App. The petitioner concedes that her voluntary consent to the search would have been binding upon him. No, “there can be no consent under such circumstances.” “When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given. The Supreme Court sent the case back to the state court to determine whether the youth was in custody when he was interrogated. The assistant principal urged J. D. B. to "do the right thing," warning J. D. B. that "the truth always comes out in the end." Stay up-to-date with FindLaw's newsletter for legal professionals. The defendant's education is another personal characteristic that may generate "conclusions about behavior and perception." See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U. S. 412, 425-426 (1986). "The Court's decision in this case may seem on first consideration to be modest and sensible, but in truth it is neither, Alito writes.