.

With respect to the general scope of federal habeas review, § 2241, which grants federal courts the statutory authority to issue writs of habeas corpus, makes no mention of guilt and innocence or of the need to balance the interests of the State and the prisoner. In the light of the historic purpose of habeas corpus and the interests implicated by successive petitions for federal habeas relief from a state conviction, we conclude that the "ends of justice" require federal courts to entertain such petitions only where the prisoner supplements his constitutional claim with a colorable showing of factual innocence. 28 U.S.C.

Thus, the "first six pages of the dissent" has as much "relevance" to this case as does Part II-B of the plurality's opinion. 142, 146-148 (1970). We pointed out that under Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), it is irrelevant whether the informant asks pointed questions about the crime or "merely engage[s] in general conversation about it." counsel must be made in light of this obligation." Prior to trial in a New York court, respondent moved to suppress the statements on the ground that they were obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The court also found that respondent's statements to Lee were "spontaneous" and "unsolicited." Lee informed Cullen of respondent's statements and furnished Cullen with notes that he had written surreptitiously while sharing the cell with respondent. But makes clear that making statements to a suspect does not make an informer “active.” So in essence, informers can make statements but not ask questions, even if the effects may be very similar. BURGER, C. J., filed a concurring opinion. In 1867, Congress authorized the federal courts to grant habeas relief to persons in the custody of the States. The court conceded that the evidence of respondent's guilt "was nearly overwhelming. As we have stated, the permissive language of § 2244(b) of course gives the federal courts discretion to decide whether to entertain a successive petition, and since Sanders those courts have relied on the phrase "ends of justice" as a general standard for identifying cases in which successive review may be appropriate. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985). The jury convicted respondent of common-law murder and felonious possession of a weapon. He also advanced a complete justification for returning to federal court a second time with this claim. . By clicking on this tab, you are expressly stating that you were one of the attorneys appearing in this matter. Ibid. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 474-475 (1976). Second, Henry was not aware that Nichols was acting as an informant.

JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, dissenting. . The narrow question in Sanders was whether a federal prisoner's motion under 28 U.S.C. Thus, the majority's rejection of the conclusion reached by the judges who previously had considered respondent's claim was based on its refusal to accept the trial court's factual determinations. The State intentionally created a situation in which it was forseeable that respondent would make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 476. provisions for a qualified application of the doctrine of res judicata." change. Academic Content. He also expressed the view that habeas petitions needed to stop being abused. Ibid. Congress clearly intended that courts continue to determine which successive petitions they may choose not to hear by reference to the Sanders ends-of-justice standard. Like Nichols, Lee was a secret informant, usually received consideration for the services he rendered the police, and therefore had an incentive to produce the information which he knew the police hoped to obtain. The Court of Appeals in that case found a violation of Massiah because the informant had engaged the defendant in conversations and "had developed a relationship of trust and confidence with [the defendant] such that [the defendant] revealed incriminating information." Relying in part on Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), the court reasoned that the "deliberately elicited" test of Massiah requires something more than incriminating statements uttered in the absence of counsel. We think that for there to be a violation of Henry what you need is some form of... excuse me, a violation of the Sixth Amendment as interpreted by Henry and other decisions of the Court... you have to have some form of deliberate elicitation. As our recent examination of this Sixth Amendment issue in, The terms "successive petition" and "abuse of the writ" have distinct meanings. Respondent also denied any involvement in the robbery or murder, claiming that he had fled because he was afraid of being blamed for the crimes. He also advanced a complete justification for returning to federal court a second time with this claim. POWELL, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, IV, and V, in which BURGER, C. J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts II and III, in which BURGER, C. J., and REHNQUIST and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined.
441, 452 (1963). .

And, like Nichols, Lee encouraged respondent to talk about his crime by conversing with him on the subject over the course of several days and by telling respondent that his exculpatory story would not convince anyone without more work. In concluding that it was appropriate to entertain respondent's successive habeas corpus petition, the Court of Appeals relied upon Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963), which announced guidelines for the federal courts to follow when presented with habeas petitions or their equivalent claimed to be "successive" or an "abuse of the writ." Audio Transcription for Oral Argument - January 14, 1986 in Kuhlmann v. Wilson Steven R. Kartagener: The district court the second time around gave also appropriate respect to those findings of spontaneity, and it was just the Second Circuit that chose willy-nilly to disregard them. 372 U.S., at 433. We now consider the limited circumstances under which the interests of the prisoner in relitigating constitutional claims held meritless on a prior petition may outweigh the countervailing interests served by according finality to the prior judgment. Ibid. 91-92 (1981) (describing relevant bills introduced in past several Congresses). because he did not even know that he was under interrogation by a government agent.'" 142, 148-149 (1970). This case is clearly distinguishable from, The Court of Appeals noted that "[a]s soon as Wilson arrived and viewed the garage, he became upset and stated that `someone's messing with me.'". More specifically, I believe that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in entertaining the petition in this case, although I would also conclude that this is one of those close cases in which the District Court could have properly decided that a second review of the same contention was not required despite the intervening decision in United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
Rather, the Court of Appeals expressly accepted that finding, Wilson v. Henderson, 742 F.2d 741, 745 (CA2 1984) ("[e]ven accepting that Lee did not ask Wilson any direct questions . In construing this language, we are cognizant that Congress adopted the section in light of the need — often recognized by this Court — to weigh the interests of the individual prisoner against the sometimes contrary interests of the State in administering a fair and rational system of criminal laws. Reverse the judgment overturning the district court’s denial of the defendant’s habeas petition. When a district court is confronted with the question whether the "ends of justice" would be served by entertaining a state prisoner's petition for habeas corpus raising a claim that has been rejected on a prior federal petition for the same relief, one of the facts that may properly be considered is whether the petitioner has advanced a "colorable claim of innocence." . Ibid. Id., at 273; see id., at 271, n. 9. . Docket no. [h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. Noting that Henry reserved the question whether the Constitution forbade admission in evidence of an accused's statements to an informant who made "no effort to stimulate conversations about the crime charged," see United States v. Henry, supra, at 271, n. 9, the District Court believed that this case presented that open question and that the question must be answered negatively. In the instant case, as in Henry, the accused was incarcerated and therefore was "susceptible to the ploys of undercover Government agents." The fact that Congress has been made aware of our longstanding construction and has chosen to leave it undisturbed, "lends powerful support to [its] continued viability." The State intentionally created a situation in which it was forseeable that respondent would make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel, Henry, 447 U.S., at 274 — it assigned respondent to a cell overlooking the scene of the crime and designated a secret informant to be respondent's cellmate. The Senate Report explicitly states that the "purpose" of the amendments was to "alleviate the unnecessary burden" by adding "to section 2244 . 28 U.S.C. We denied a petition for a writ of certiorari. Similarly, Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254, which were adopted in 1976, states that a "second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the merits or, if new and different grounds are alleged, the judge finds that the failure of the petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ." JUSTICE POWELL announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, IV, and V, and an opinion with respect to Parts II and III in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE REHNQUIST, and JUSTICE O'CONNOR join. . .

In Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15 (1963), we held that a federal court may refuse to entertain a successive petition for habeas relief or its equivalent under 28 U.S.C. Held. While the dissent today purports to provide some substance to the Sanders standard by requiring a "good justification" for relitigation of a claim previously decided, its standard provides no real guidance to federal courts confronted with successive claims for habeas corpus relief. On the contrary, we have stated expressly that on habeas review "what we have to deal with is not the petitioners' innocence or guilt but solely the question whether their constitutional rights have been preserved." It is violated, however, when "the State obtains incriminating statements by knowingly circumventing the accused's right to have counsel present in a confrontation between the accused and a state agent." The agents instructed the confederate to "engage Massiah in conversation relating to the alleged crimes." Brief Fact Summary. Ante, at 454; see also ante, at 448-452. . Id., at 177, n. 13.