Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 444 U. S. 662 (1980); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 612-613.

REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. Section 290.09 contains no express statements of legislative purpose, and its legislative history offers few unambiguous indications of actual intent. Of equal importance, as the majority also concedes, the "economic consequenc[e]" of these programs is the same, ante at 463 U. S. 397, n. 6, for in each case, the "financial assistance provided to parents ultimately has an economic effect comparable to that of aid given directly to the schools." (a) The tax deduction in question has the secular purpose of ensuring that the State's citizenry is well educated, as well as of assuring the continued financial health of private schools, both sectarian and nonsectarian. Of these, all but 29 were sectarian. Nyquist, supra, at 413 U. S. 789.

In my view, the lines drawn in Nyquist were drawn on a reasoned basis, with appropriate regard for the principles of neutrality embodied by the Establishment Clause. (b) The deduction does not have the primary effect of advancing the sectarian aims of nonpublic schools.

By ensuring that parents will be reimbursed for tuition payments they make, the Minnesota statute requires that taxpayers in general pay for the cost of parochial education and extends a financial incentive to parents to send their children to sectarian schools.

The District Court granted respondents' motion for summary judgment, holding that the statute was "neutral on its face and in its application, and does not have a primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion." Indeed, in this respect the Minnesota statute has an even greater tendency to promote religious education than the New York statute struck down in Nyquist, since the percentage of private schools that are nonsectarian is far greater in New York than in Minnesota. ); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. at 421 U. S. 359-362, with id.

This decision demonstrates that it is irrelevant whether the amount of a tax benefit is proportionate to the amount of tuition paid or is simply an arbitrary sum. The Court concludes that the Minnesota statute is "vitally different" from the New York statute at issue in Nyquist.

In both cases, the class of beneficiaries included all schoolchildren, those in public as well as those in private schools.

at 413 U. S. 789-791; see ante at 463 U. S. 396-397, n. 6. Id. provided. "Parents who send their children to free public schools are simply ineligible to obtain the full benefit of the deduction except in the unlikely event that they buy $700 worth of pencils, notebooks, and bus rides for their children."

As demonstrated below, there is no significant difference between the two schemes. v. Grumet, Arizona Christian Sch. Ante at 463 U. S. 399, 463 U. S. 400. at 413 U. S. 777-779, 413 U. S. 787-788.

[Footnote 4], We turn therefore to the more difficult but related question whether the Minnesota statute has "the primary effect of advancing the sectarian aims of the nonpublic schools." Moreover, several memoranda prepared by the Minnesota Department of Revenue in 1979 -- stating that a number of specific expenses may be deducted by parents with children in public school -- clearly indicate that the summary discussion in the 1976 memorandum was not intended as any comprehensive or binding agency determination.

Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83, 309 U. S. 88 (1940). Tuition Org. It is only one of many deductions -- such as those for medical expenses and charitable contributions -- available under the Minnesota tax laws; is available for educational expenses incurred by all parents, whether their children attend public schools or private sectarian or nonsectarian private schools, Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, distinguished; and provides aid to parochial schools only as a result of decisions of individual parents, rather than directly from the State to the schools themselves.

A Minnesota statute (§ 290.09, subd. Meek v. Pittenger, supra, at 421 U. S. 366. 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 782-783, n. 38 (emphasis in original). .

Rehnquist noted that the statute was facially neutral on religion and rejected the plaintiff's argument that its religious partiality was evidenced by the fact that 96% of the private schools in Minnesota were sectarian institutions.

Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath. ", "6. The other deductible expenses are de minimis in comparison to tuition expenses. Moreover, the fact that private persons fail in a particular year to claim the tax relief to which they are entitled -- under a facially neutral statute -- should be of little importance in determining the constitutionality of the statute permitting such relief. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 413 U. S. 742 (1973). In contrast, the Minnesota statute does not limit the tax deduction to those books which the State has approved for use in public schools. See also id. Under our system, the choice has been made that government is to be entirely excluded from the area of religious instruction.

Id. Notwithstanding the repeated approval given programs such as those in Allen and Everson, our decisions also have struck down arrangements resembling, in many respects, these forms of assistance. Costs of home economics materials needed to meet minimum requirements.

See, e.g., Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U. S. 291 (1899); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970). ", "5.

The majority first attempts to distinguish Nyquist on the ground that Minnesota makes all parents eligible to deduct up to $500 or $700 for each dependent, whereas the New York law allowed a deduction only for parents whose children attended nonpublic schools. Id. Discussion. As the Court stated in Everson, 330 U.S. at 330 U. S. 16, and has often repeated, see, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. at 421 U. S. 359; Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 780: "No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.". First, an essential feature of Minnesota's arrangement is the fact that § 290.09, subd. . Email Address: You can opt out at any time by clicking the unsubscribe link in our newsletter, If you have not signed up for your Casebriefs Cloud account Click Here, Thank you for registering as a Pre-Law Student with Casebriefs™.

22 (1982). . The plaintiffs claimed that a Minnesota statute, allowing tax deductions for both public and private school expenses, had the effect of subsidizing religious instruction since parents who paid tuition to religious schools received a larger deduction than parents of public school students, who incurred no tuition expenses. I would therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for a determination whether the insignificant deductions that remain -- e.g., deductions for transportation between home and school and for pencils and notebooks -- are severable from the other deductions. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664, 397 U. S. 668 (1970). ", "9. necessarily results in aid to the sectarian school enterprise as a whole" because "[t]he very purpose of many of those schools is to provide an integrated secular and religious education." Ante at 463 U. S. 396. Justice Marshall wrote the dissenting opinion, agreed to by three other justices. Similarly, in Sloan v. Lemon, supra, at 413 U. S. 830, we considered important to our, "consider[ation of] the new law's effect . Moreover, private schools, and parents paying for their children to attend these schools, make special contributions to the areas in which the schools operate.

This result is flatly at odds with the fundamental principle that a State may provide no financial support whatsoever to promote religion. "The sole question is whether state aid to these schools can be squared with the dictates of the Religion Clauses.

The only factual inquiry necessary is the same as that employed in Nyquist, and Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U. S. 825 (1973): whether the deduction permitted for tuition expenses primarily benefits those who send their children to religious schools. In calculating their net income for state income tax purposes, Minnesota residents are permitted to deduct the cost of their children's tuition, subject to a ceiling of $500 or $700 per child. 22, permits all parents -- whether their children attend public school or private -- to deduct their children's educational expenses. A State's decision to defray the cost of educational expenses incurred by parents -- regardless of the type of schools their children attend -- evidences a purpose that is both secular and understandable. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 22, in application, the statute primarily benefits religious institutions. ", In Byrne v. Public Funds for Public Schools, we summarily affirmed a decision striking down a program of tax deductions. For similar reasons, I would hold that the deduction for transportation expenses is constitutional only insofar as it relates to the costs of traveling between home and school. The same result follows in this case. § 120.06 (1982). v. Winn, Westside Community Board of Ed. The exception, of course, was Nyquist, which, as discussed previously, is distinguishable from this case on other grounds.

Id.

Decided June 29, 1983.

Minnesota allows taxpayers, in computing their state income tax, to deduct certain expenses incurred in providing for the education of their children.

22, permits deductions for amounts spent for textbooks and transportation as well as tuition. While "services such as police and fire protection, sewage disposal, highways, and sidewalks," may be provided to parochial schools in common with other institutions, because this type of assistance is clearly "marked off from the religious function'" of those schools, Nyquist, supra, at 413 U. S. 781-782, quoting Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 330 U. S. 18 (1947), unrestricted financial assistance, such as grants for the maintenance and construction of parochial schools, may not be.

Givhan v. Western Line Consol. The Court's holding in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970), indicates, however, that this does not require the conclusion that such provisions of a State's tax law violate the Establishment Clause. See id.

at 413 U. S. 786. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664, 397 U. S. 699 (1970) (opinion of Harlan, J.). Likewise, in Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968), we approved state loans of textbooks to all schoolchildren; although we disapproved, in Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349 (1975), and Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229 (1977), direct loans of instructional materials to sectarian schools, we do not find those cases controlling. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), was a United States Supreme Court case examining the constitutionality of a state tax deduction granted to taxpaying parents for school-related expenses, including expenses incurred from private secular and religious schools. at 413 U. S. 780, 413 U. S. 785-786. . 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 783. has a primary effect that advances religion. [Footnote 9] Petitioners rely, as they did.