Indeed, in the efficacy of the "public-safety" exception lies a fundamental and constitutional defect. When police ask custodial questions without administering the required warnings, Miranda quite clearly requires that the answers received be presumed compelled and that they be excluded from evidence at trial. In New York v. Quarles (1984), the Supreme Court created the "public safety" exception to the Miranda rule. 5a, 7a-8a. The majority implies that Miranda consisted of no more than a judicial balancing act in which the benefits of "enlarged protection for the Fifth Amendment privilege" were weighed against "the cost to society in terms of fewer convictions of guilty suspects." It found a “public safety” exception to the. After a detailed examination of police practices and a review of its previous decisions in the area, the Court in Miranda determined that custodial interrogations are inherently coercive. (quoting Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 598, 102 S.Ct. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444, 94 S.Ct. This assumption is completely in conflict with the facts as found by New York's highest court. Only because the State dropped the rape count and chose to proceed to trial solely on the criminal-possession charge did respondent's answer to Officer Kraft's question become critical. NEW YORK v. QUARLES(1984) No. The Fifth Amendment itself does not prohibit all incriminating admissions; "[a]bsent some officially coerced self-accusation, the Fifth Amendment privilege is not violated by even the most damning admissions."

In these circumstances, this Court has jurisdiction. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718, 99 S.Ct. 682 (1936).

He frisked him and discovered that he was wearing a shoulder holster which was then empty.

Behind the cartons, the police found a loaded revolver. must first prevail in a voluntariness hearing before his confession and evidence derived from it [will] become inadmissible." 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), a decision this Court handed down a week after of deciding Miranda. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the Court held unconstitutional, because inherently compelled, the admission of statements derived from in-custody questioning not preceded by an explanation of the privilege against self-incrimination and the consequences of forgoing it. Ibid. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55, 84 S.Ct. 2512-80 (N.Y.App.Div. The Miranda Court itself considered objections akin to those raised by the Court today. Use of a suspect's answers "merely to find other evidence establishing his connection with the crime [simply] differs only by a shade from the permitted use for that purpose of his body or his blood."

2501, 2508, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (footnote omitted). The blood tests were admissible because they were neither testimonial nor communicative in nature. Michigan v. Tucker, supra, 417 U.S., at 444, 94 S.Ct., at 2364. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), this Court held that the Government may not introduce incriminating evidence derived from an illegally obtained source. ." P. 657. In short there was no exigency requiring immediate action by the officers beyond the normal need expeditiously to solve a serious crime. He has argued only that police failed to administer Miranda warnings. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court found that the jurisprudential rule of Miranda must yield in "a situation where concern for public safety must be paramount to adherence to the literal language of the prophylactic rules enunciated in Miranda". The majority attempts to distinguish Orozco by stressing the fact that the interrogation in this case immediately followed Quarles' arrest whereas the interrogation in Orozco occurred some four hours after the crime and was investigatory. I find in this reasoning an unwise and unprincipled departure from our Fifth Amendment precedents. Id., at 223, 91 S.Ct., at 644. . Similar approaches have been rejected in other contexts.

According to the majority, the police must now choose between establishing the suspect's guilt and safeguarding the public from danger.

Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S., at 304, 100 S.Ct., at 1691 (concurring in judgment). The dissent argues that a public safety exception to Miranda is unnecessary because in every case an officer can simply ask the necessary questions to protect himself or the public, and then the prosecution can decline to introduce any incriminating responses at a subsequent trial. 1232, 1243-1244, and n. 12, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977) (leaving open question whether any evidence beyond the incriminating statements themselves must be excluded); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207, 84 S.Ct. New York v. Quarles Case Brief. 1594, 1596, 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964).

"the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." Indeed, the accused is in the unique position of seeking the protection of the privilege without having timely asserted it.

Brief for Respondent 51-55. Gesturing towards a stack of liquid-soap cartons a few feet away, Quarles responded: "The gun is over there." The majority attempts to slip away from these unambiguous findings of New York's highest court by proposing that danger be measured by objective facts rather than the subjective intentions of arresting officers. See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347-348, 96 S.Ct. . In the subsequent prosecution of respondent for criminal possession of a weapon,2 the judge excluded the statement, "the gun is over there," and the gun because the officer had not given respondent the warnings required by our decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. But the Court in Schmerber, with Miranda fresh on its mind, did address the issue. When the officer arrested the suspect, he found an empty shoulder holster, handcuffed the suspect, and asked him where the gun was. 1880, 1888, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (POWELL, J., concurring). An independent reason for declining to rule on petitioner's derivative-evidence theory is that petitioner may have been barred by New York procedures from raising this theory before the New York Court of Appeals.

Ante, at 657.

One of the officers went into the grocery store and ordered respondent Quarles to stop and put his hands over his head. Cf. courts under the guise of [reinterpreting] Miranda. But as we have pointed out, we believe that the exception which we recognize today lessens the necessity of that on-the-scene balancing process. Id., at 667, 458 N.Y.S.2d, at 522, 444 N.E.2d, at 986. 407 (1972). See ante, at 654-655. In Nix v. Williams, supra, this Court construed Wong Sun to permit the introduction into evidence of constitutionally tainted "fruits" that inevitably would have been discovered by the government. The distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial evidence was explored in some detail in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. In concluding that the privilege did not require suppression of compelled blood tests, the Court noted: "This conclusion would not necessarily govern had the State tried to show that the accused had incriminated himself when told that he would have to be tested. See Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, 446 U.S., at 301, 100 S.Ct., at 1689 (officer's subjective intent to incriminate not determinative of whether "interrogation" occurred); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, and n. 6, 100 S.Ct. But the matter was undeniably of constitutional magnitude. It would strain credulity to contend that Officer Kraft's questioning of respondent Quarles was not coercive.8 In the middle of the night and in the back of an empty supermarket, Quarles was surrounded by four armed police officers. 2512/80 (N.Y.Ct.App. 2357, 2362, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974). In my view, a "public safety" exception unnecessarily blurs the edges of the clear line heretofore established and makes Miranda's requirements more difficult to understand. Second, the New York Rules of Criminal Procedure have codified the "fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree" doctrine. Having determined that the Fifth Amendment renders inadmissible Quarles' response to Officer Kraft's questioning, I have no doubt that our precedents require that the gun discovered as a direct result of Quarles' statement must be presumed inadmissible as well. that rigidity [has also been called a] strength of the decision. The Court of Appeals also determined that there was no evidence that the interrogation was prompted by the arresting officers' concern for the public's safety. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 406-407, and n. 12, 97 S.Ct.

Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 304, 100 S.Ct. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 217-223, 103 S.Ct. Although the majority stresses the exigencies of Quarles' arrest, it is undisputed that Quarles was in custody when Officer Kraft's questioning began, ante, at 655, and there is nothing in the majority's rationale—save the instincts of police officers—to prevent it from applying to all custodial interrogations. Respondent Benjamin Quarles was charged in the New York trial court with criminal possession of a weapon.