Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. It was reported that the friction caused by '(m)isuse of field interrogations' increases 'as more police departments adopt 'aggressive patrol' in which officers are encouraged routinely to stop and question persons on the street who are unknown to them, who are suspicious, or whose purpose for being abroad is not readily evident.'

392 U. S. 25-26.

The sense of exterior touch here involved is not very far different from the sense of sight or hearing—senses upon which police customarily act.' 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959). 776, 5 L.Ed.2d 828 (1961), or that in most instances failure to comply with the warrant requirement can only be excused by exigent circumstances, see, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct.

The remaining two murders were perpetrated by knives. & P.S. Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons.

[Footnote 5], On the other side, the argument is made that the authority of the police must be strictly circumscribed by the law of arrest and search as it has developed to date in the traditional jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment. If the State of Ohio were to provide that police officers could, on articulable suspicion less than probable cause, forcibly frisk and disarm persons thought to be carrying concealed weapons, I would have little doubt that action taken pursuant to such authority could be constitutionally reasonable. The question is whether in all the circumstances of this on-the-street encounter, his right to personal security was violated by an unreasonable search and seizure. The distinctions of classical 'stop-and-frisk' theory thus serve to divert attention from the central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment—the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security. "[T]here is no war between the Constitution and common sense," Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 657.

He did not conduct a general exploratory search for whatever evidence of criminal activity he might find.

However, the court denied the defendants' motion on the ground that Officer McFadden, on the basis of his experience, "had reasonable cause to believe .

At this point, keeping Terry between himself and the others, the officer ordered all three men to enter Zucker's store. Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346, 77 S.Ct. 436 (1948); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 593—595, 68 S.Ct. An exception is made for properly authorized law enforcement officers. 367, 371, 92 L.Ed.

623, 629—632 (1967).

Regardless of how effective the rule may be where obtaining convictions is an important objective of the police, [Footnote 10] it is powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights where the police either have no interest in prosecuting or are willing to forgo successful prosecution in the interest of serving some other goal. See, e.g., 70 U. S. 3 Wall.

145 (1925). By this time, Officer McFadden had become thoroughly suspicious. Thus it must be limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer of others nearby, and may realistically be characterized as something less than a 'full' search, even though it remains a serious intrusion. The Fourth Amendment applies to "stop and frisk" procedures such as those followed here. Respect for our constitutional system and personal liberty demands in return, however, that such a 'seizure' be made only upon 'probable cause.'. Thus, only Terry's conviction is here for review.

Both the trial court and the Ohio Court of Appeals in this case relied upon such a distinction. There is nothing unusual in two men standing together on a street corner, perhaps waiting for someone. We cannot say his decision at that point to seize Terry and pat his clothing for weapons was the product of a volatile or inventive imagination, or was undertaken simply as an act of harassment; the record evidences the tempered act of a policeman who in the course of an investigation had to make a quick decision as to how to protect himself and others from possible danger, and took limited steps to do so. Beck v. Ohio, supra, at 97. As they went in, he removed Terry's overcoat completely, removed a .38-caliber revolver from the pocket and ordered all three men to face the wall with their hands raised.

R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 250, 251 (1891).

Our first task is to establish at what point in this encounter the Fourth Amendment becomes relevant. 1731, 1741, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965), and experience has taught that it is the only effective deterrent to police misconduct in the criminal context, and that without it the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures would be a mere 'form of words.' 191, 194, 93 L.Ed. 1509, 1514, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964). 52, 68 L.Ed. Store windows, moreover, are made to be looked in. 734 (1891). State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App.2d 122, 130, 214 N.E.2d 114, 120 (1966). See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 156, 161-162; Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 13-15; McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 455-456; Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 479-484. Of course, the person stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest, although it may alert the officer to the need for continued observation. (b) The officer's search was confined to what was minimally necessary to determine whether the men were armed, and the intrusion, which was made for the sole purpose of protecting himself and others nearby, was confined to ascertaining the presence of weapons. The defense moved to suppress the weapons. Any search must be limited to the suspect's outer clothing and may be performed only for the purpose of discovering concealed weapons. And we said in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 176: "These long-prevailing standards [for probable cause] seek to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime.

He discovered another revolver in the outer pocket of Chilton's overcoat, but no weapons were found on Katz.

These dangers are illustrated in part by the course of adjudication in the Court of Appeals of New York.

scope of governmental action as by imposing preconditions upon its initiation. He removed petitioner's overcoat, took out a revolver, and ordered the three to face the wall with their hands raised. 1930); see, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629—635, 85 S.Ct.

We therefore reject the notions that the Fourth Amendment does not come into play at all as a limitation upon police conduct if the officers stop short of something called a 'technical arrest' or a 'full-blown search.'.

223, 226, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174—176, 69 S.Ct. The scope of the search in this case presents no serious problem in light of these standards. 'I get more purpose to watch them when I seen their movements,' he testified.

(e) A search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest must be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies of the situation. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 479-480 (1963). & P.S. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 183 (1949) (Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting).

Syllabus. The general warrant, in which the name of the person to be arrested was left blank, and the writs of assistance, against which James Otis inveighed, both perpetuated the oppressive practice of allowing the police to arrest and search on suspicion.

Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222, 80 S.Ct. 168, 170: 'The requirement of probable cause has roots that are deep in our history. Because many situations which confront officers in the course of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part.

The holding has, however, two logical corollaries that I do not think the Court has fully expressed. In dealing with rapidly unfolding and increasingly dangerous situations, the Court said, police may find it impractical or impossible to obtain a search warrant before choosing to intervene. Constitutional Commentary 16 (winter). The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed their appeal on the ground that no 'substantial constitutional question' was involved.

This holding, with which I agree and with which I think the Court agrees, offers the only satisfactory basis I can think of for affirming this conviction.

at 413.

At the time he seized petitioner and searched him for weapons, Officer McFadden had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioner was armed and dangerous, and it was necessary for the protection of himself and others to take swift measures to discover the true facts and neutralize the threat of harm if it materialized.

393, 396 403 (1963). The Fourth Amendment governs areas where individuals maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy, including a zone of personal freedom in which every individual is secure from unnecessary and unreasonable governmental intrusion.

So far as appears from the record, he never placed his hands beneath Katz' outer garments.

Given that he chose to investigate further, the Court said, it was reasonable for McFadden to assure himself that none of the suspects was armed, especially after they failed to respond intelligibly to his request for identification.