If the restrictions are good enough for the FBI, they should be workable for local law enforcement in Illinois.”. Lower courts seem confused about which analytical framework to apply to stingray cases and how the technology should be assessed within those frameworks. Few jurisdictions have willingly admitted to deploying stingray devices. The Department of Justice, which has deployed stingrays for years, only recently announced an initial stingray policy for Justice Department agencies, and it leaves much to be desired. The purpose of this paper is to illuminate those issues and to suggest some possible legislative and judicial remedies. google_ad_height = 90; The releases have, however, revealed thousands of warrantless stingray uses across the country for entirely routine law enforcement actions. By signing onto these federal initiatives, state and local police are essentially pledging to take on federal law enforcement responsibilities in exchange for being allowed to acquire federal resources. U.S. District Judge William Pauley in Manhattan ruled that the defendant’s rights were violated when the DEA used a stingray without a warrant in order to find the suspects home. If terrorists and drug runners get wind of what stingrays are and how they operate, as the argument goes, then suspects will be able to neutralize the surveillance by changing their behavior.30. The concern is explicitly mentioned in the nondisclosure agreement itself, which states that disclosure would empower surveillance targets to “employ countermeasures to avoid detection.” Supra, note 24. 7.
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There are two methods of using the IMSI to locate a phone: the government can either ask the third‐party carrier to voluntarily reveal the IMSI of a particular phone or compel the carrier under a court order.
A Stingray works by masquerading as a cell phone tower – to which your mobile phone sends signals to every 7 to 15 seconds whether you are on a call or not – and tricks your phone into connecting to it.” As a result, whoever is in possession of the Stingray can figure out who, when, and to where you are calling, the precise location of every device within the range, and with some devices, even capture the content of your conversations. See the master list of stingray deployments by the Tallahassee Police Department, March 27, 2014, Fusion, https://fusiondotnet.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/03.27.2014_-_master_ce_log.pdf. Cyrus Farivar, ““California Cops, Want to Use a Stingray? While police departments have been reluctant to reveal details about their uses of stingray devices unless forced to by court orders, the data thus far suggests that cases such — as the ones in Michigan and Tacoma, Washington — represent a trend. The few instances of courts assessing the legality of stingray use have come to different conclusions, citing different precedents, and it could be years before these splits in Fourth Amendment interpretations are resolved. Surveillance technology, designed for use on battlefields or in antagonistic states where constitutional concerns are minimal, has increasingly found its way into the hands of local law enforcement, often without any discernible effort to adapt the equipment or the policies governing its tactical use to the home front, where targets are citizens with constitutional rights rather than battlefield combatants. Required fields are marked *. The police were able to track Andrews to a specific home in Baltimore. google_ad_slot = "4202262887";
Legislatures should require law enforcement agencies to publish stingray policies that detail the circumstances under which stingray use is authorized, to publish data retention guidelines, and to resolve to seek a warrant or a probable cause analogue before deploying stingrays.
What was the, it was a warrantless arrest. // ]]> The Electronic Frontier Foundation describes stingrays as “a brand name of an IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity) Catcher targeted and sold to law enforcement. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). The FBI wields considerable control over whether a particular case reaches a verdict, and therefore whether it is likely to result in a clear ruling from a judge on the constitutionality of stingray use. It is important to note, however, that while these policies represent a step toward transparency on the part of the federal government, they are merely internal administrative policies. Illinois Governor Signs Bill Requiring Warrant For “Stingray” Surveillance. 11 As the names suggest — both were originally methods of obtaining information from telegraph machines — these legal standards were created at a time when today’s technological infrastructure could scarcely be imagined. Evidence from numerous jurisdictions shows state and local prosecutors doing precisely what the nondisclosure agreement ostensibly demands: dropping evidence or even entire prosecutions against criminal suspects when their defense attorneys suspect that stingrays were used in the investigations of their clients and demand to see the devices in court. The Court ruled that the physical trespass onto Jones’s property represented a search.
The California state legislature recently passed a bill imposing a warrant requirement on state and local stingray use in California,67 while states such as New York and Missouri are considering similar legislation.68. But the efforts at secrecy, the lack of accountability, and the twisted incentives created by federal meddling in state and local law enforcement beg for reform. It sends out signals to trick cell phones in the area into transmitting their locations and identifying information.
52. The cross‐examination of a police officer from another Maryland case transcript reveals the position in which judges find themselves in court. Justin Fenton, “Baltimore Police Used Secret Technology to Track Cellphones in Thousands of Cases,” Baltimore Sun, April 9, 2015, http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-stingray-case-20150408-story.html. 18 U.S.C. A decade later, some members of the Court had begun to question the applicability of the expectation of privacy test in light of modern technology. The police and prosecution refused to say. Police sought and received a court order to use a pen/trap device to surveil Andrews’ phone. 12. One of the reasons for the concern is the amount of secrecy surrounding the use of the stingrays. As the stingray forces cell phones in a target area to connect to it, the operator can screen the incoming “ripped” IMSI numbers against the known IMSI number he or she is trying to track. google_ad_width = 600; 44. A typical cell phone could connect and reconnect dozens of times in a given day in order to achieve the strongest signal as the user travels.
The device is known as a stingray, and it is being used in at least 23 states and the District of Columbia. Indeed, much of the funding for these devices comes to state and local law enforcement through federal homeland security and defense grants, such as the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI).31 Competition for this grant money invariably skews law enforcement priorities away from investigating and preventing typical crimes and toward national security functions. With so much of our daily activity being sent to third‐party Internet and telephone service providers, the level of constitutional protection afforded to such data becomes a much more significant question than it was decades ago. 13.
FinCEN Leaks: Who Benefits From the Disclosure? But interested defense lawyers and civil liberties advocates have uncovered evidence that the use of stingray devices by domestic law enforcement agencies poses a litany of legal and ethical questions. 49 The Court ruled that using “sense‐enhancing technology” to peer into private homes was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and therefore required a warrant based upon probable cause. 36.
The FCC, for its part, has denied any responsibility for both the terms of the FBI’s nondisclosure agreement and the requirement that state and local law enforcement agencies agree to it in the first place.28 Notwithstanding these statements, state and local law enforcement agencies around the country have, rightly or wrongly, interpreted the agreement to mean that they are not allowed to disclose the nature of stingray surveillance devices to courts or defense attorneys.
63. That director — George H.W. As more has been revealed and the breadth of stingray use has become more widely known, it is fair to anticipate that the amount of judicial analysis will increase.