fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by the same summer and winter, as a Christian is? history largely in chronological sequence, dealing separately with the Senate and House debates.

(c) On its face, the language of § 1982 appears to prohibit all discrimination against Negroes in the sale or rental of property.

One of those cases, Trump v. Vance, concerns a New York district attorney’s subpoena for Trump’s tax returns and other financial documents from his accounting firm Mazars as part of a grand jury investigation of possible falsifying of state business records surrounding potential federal campaign finance violations.

The end is the maintenance of freedom * * *. 1967) ('freedom-of-choice' plans in States within the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit); Northcross v. Board of Education, 302 F.2d 818 (C.A.6th Cir.

. Earlier in the same speech, Representative Cook had described actual vagrancy laws which had recently been passed by reconstructed Southern legislatures.

. Contrast the Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 804(a). is analogous .

See, e.g., n. 31, supra.

The Court puts forward in support of its construction an impressive number of quotations from and citations to the Senate debates. The Court rests its opinion chiefly upon the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The court held that the state action in the Hurd case was the use of the court system to enforce the covenants. that would be prohibitory legislation. ", "Its potential for effectiveness,' he added, 'is probably much greater than [§ 1982] because of the sanctions and the remedies that it provides.".

The Court's citation, ante, at 427-428, of Senate references to 'white citizens who assaulted Negroes' is not in point, for the debate cited by the Court concerned the Freedmen's bill, not the civil rights bill.27 The former by its terms forbade discrimination pursuant to 'prejudice,' as well as 'custom,' and in any event neither bill provided a remedy for the victim of a racially motivated assault.28. PER CURIAM [¶1] Intervenors The Committee for Ranked Choice Voting and three individuals (collectively, “Committee”) … First, they claim that the respondents acted in violation of 42 U.S.C.

. See L. Litwack, supra, at 112.

The first was by Congressman Windom, [Footnote 3/46] and close examination reveals that his only mention of assaults was with regard to a Texas "pass system," under which freedmen were whipped if found abroad without passes, and a South Carolina law permitting freedmen to be whipped for insolence. W. Dubois, Black Reconstruction in America 10 (1964).1.

The three additional statements of Senator Trumbull and the remarks of senatorial opponents of the bill, quoted by the Court, ante at 392 U. S. 431-433, to show the bill's sweeping scope, are entirely ambiguous as to whether the speakers thought the bill prohibited only state-sanctioned conduct or reached wholly private action as well.

Since he had just stated that the purpose of that clause was to enable Congress to nullify acts of the state legislatures, it seems inferable that this was also to be the aim of the promised bills. See also § 815 of the 1968 Act: 'Nothing in this title shall be construed to invalidate or limit any law of * * * any * * * jurisdiction in which this title shall be effective, that grants, guarantees, or protects the * * * rights * * * granted by this title * * *.'. Addressing itself to that narrow question, the Court said that none of the provisions relied upon by the appellants prohibited private individuals from "enter[ing] into . 100 U.S., at 319—322. On February 2, replying to Senator Davis of Kentucky, he said: "Why, sir, if the State of Kentucky makes no discrimination in civil rights between its citizens, this bill has no operation whatever in the State of Kentucky. at 339-340, 1160, 1835. However, it is apparent that the Senate regarded the report merely as background, and it figured relatively little in the debates. But the Civil Rights Act was drafted to apply throughout the country, [Footnote 35] and its language was far. See generally the discussion in the dissenting opinion, post, at 464—467. One of the proposals, sponsored by Senator Wilson of Massachusetts, would have declared void all 'laws, statutes, acts, ordinances, rules, and regulations' establishing or maintaining in former rebel States 'any inequality of civil rights and immunities' on account of 'color, race, or * * * a previous condition * * * of slavery.'

Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369.

"It would be running the slavery argument into the ground," the Court thought, "to make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to make as to the guests he will entertain or as to the people he will take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his concert or theatre, or deal with in other matters of intercourse or business. .

[Footnote 5], At the outset, it is important to make clear precisely what this case does not involve.

What penalty is imposed upon others than officers who inflict these wrongs on the citizen? In Rice v. Sioux City Cemetery, supra, the issue was whether a privately owned cemetery might defend a suit for breach of a contract to bury on the ground that the decedent was a Winnebago Indian and the contract restricted burial privileges to Caucasians. The basic source of the injury in Hurd was, of course, the action of private individuals—white citizens who had agreed to exclude Negroes from a residential area. Who is to decide what that appropriate legislation is to be? WILSON, of Iowa. It is to prevent that great measure from remaining a dead letter upon the constitutional page of this country.

§ 1982 (then § 1978 of the Revised Statutes) does not prohibit private individuals from agreeing not to sell their property to Negroes, Corrigan would not settle the question whether § 1982 prohibits an actual refusal to sell to a Negro.

'Its potential for effectiveness,' he added, 'is probably much greater than (§ 1982) because of the sanctions and the remedies that it provides. .

I have no doubt that, under this provision . They can pass law that a man not supporting himself by labor shall, be deemed a vagrant, and that a vagrant shall be sold. 427, 433, 74 L.Ed. Id., at 331, 46 S.Ct., at 524. Id. . , appears to be the last of the major areas of discrimination that the states have been willing to attack.". [Footnote 3/29] The remark of Senator Lane which is quoted by the Court, ante at 392 U. S. 433, to prove that he viewed the bill as reaching "the white man .

. '50 However, up to that time there had been no mention whatever in the House debates of any purely private discrimination,51 so one can only conclude that by 'individual cases' Representative Eldridge meant isolated cases,' not 'cases of purely private discrimination.'.

. But it would be a serious mistake to infer from such statements any notion (see the dissenting opinion, post at 392 U. S. 460) that, so long as the States refrained from actively discriminating against Negroes, their "obligations" in this area, as Senator Trumbull and others understood them, would have been fulfilled. Part V of this opinion, infra. After mature reflection, however, I have concluded that this is one of those rare instances in which an event which occurs after the hearing of argument so diminishes a case's public significance, when viewed in light of the difficulty of the questions presented, as to justify this Court in dismissing the writ as improvidently granted.

Sir, in at least six of the lately rebellious States the reconstructed Legislatures of those States have enacted laws which, if permitted to be enforced, would strike a fatal blow at the liberty of the freedmen * * *.'39.

.

.

. 14,897) (dictum of Mr. Justice Bradley, on circuit), aff'd, 92 U. S. 542; United States v. Morris, 125 F. 322, 324, 330-331. Id., at 1781. The conclusion of the majority in Hodges rested upon a concept of congressional power under the Thirteenth Amendment irreconcilable with the position taken by every member of this Court in the Civil Rights Cases and incompatible with the history and purpose of the Amendment itself.