Code Ann. Ct.), p. 32. 27A, §§2(h)(2), 4(b)(2) (1957-1997); Nev. Rev.

More significant, the sole issue at the hearing--apart from determinations about the necessity of confinement, see Ala. Code §15-22-54(d)(4) (1975)--is whether the defendant breached the terms of probation. 13, §5201 (1998). "We would normally expect notice of an intent to make so far-reaching an argument in the respondent's opposition to a petition for certiorari, cf. Any sanction imposed would be for "post-conviction wrongdoing," not for the offense of conviction. this Court's Rule 15.2, thereby assuring adequate preparation time for those likely affected and wishing to participate." Audio Transcription for Opinion Announcement - May 20, 2002 in Alabama v. Shelton Audio Transcription for Oral Argument - February 19, 2002 in Alabama v. Shelton Sandra Day O'Connor: Mhm. (Emphasis added.) Rather, the critical point was that the defendant had a recognized right to counsel when adjudicated guilty of the felony for which he was imprisoned. §§31-16-2(D), §31-16-3(A) (2000); Ohio Rules Crim. §106(c)(2) (1998); S. D. Codified Laws §§23A-40-6, 23-40-6.1, 22-6-2(1) (1998); see also Conn. Gen. Stat. App. App. ; see, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Appointed counsel must henceforth be offered before any defendant can be awarded a suspended sentence, no matter how short. . Amicus also contends that "practical considerations clearly weigh against" the extension of the Sixth Amendment appointed-counsel right to a defendant in Shelton's situation. There is not so much as a hint, however, in the decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama, that Shelton's probation term is separable from the prison term to which it was tethered. The Alabama Supreme Court has thus already spoken on the issue we now address, and in doing so expressed not the slightest hint that revocation-stage procedures--real or imaginary--would affect the constitutional calculus. (Typical "summary offenses" in Pennsylvania include the failure to return a library book within 30 days, 18 Pa. Cons. 1 v. Hortonville Ed. §§604-A:2(I), 625:9(IV)(a)(1) (Supp. §2A:158A-5.2 (1985); State v. Hermanns, 278 N. J. Super. Assn., 426 U. S. 482, 488. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals in relevant part. We hold that a suspended sentence that may "end up in the actual deprivation of a person's liberty" may not be imposed unless the defendant was accorded "the guiding hand of counsel" in the prosecution for the crime charged. state-appointed counsel. 6-16. Those decisions do not stand for the broad proposition that sequential proceedings must be analyzed separately for Sixth Amendment purposes, with the right to state-appointed counsel triggered only in proceedings that result in immediate actual imprisonment. Misdemeanors punishable by less than six months' imprisonment may be a narrow category, but it may well include the vast majority of cases in which (precisely because of the minor nature of the offense) a suspended sentence is imposed. This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.

In Alabama, however, the character of the probation revocation hearing currently afforded is not in doubt. Ten of the thirty-four States cited by the Court do not offer appointed counsel in all cases where a misdemeanor defendant might suffer a suspended sentence. 41. Fried Brief 18, 23-24. Assn., 426 U. S. 482, 488 (1976) ("We are, of course, bound to accept the interpretation of [the State's] law by the highest court of the State."). To assure full airing of the question presented, we invited an amicus curiae ("amicus") to argue in support of a third position, one Alabama has abandoned: Failure to appoint counsel to an indigent defendant "does not bar the imposition of a suspended or probationary sentence upon conviction of a misdemeanor, even though the defendant might be incarcerated in the event probation is revoked." Alabama In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25, 37 (1972), we held that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense ... unless he was represented by counsel at his trial." Several years earlier, unrepresented by counsel, he was fined but not incarcerated for the state misdemeanor of driving under the influence (DUI). It did not answer (because it did not consider) the question whether procedures attending the probation revocation proceeding could cure the absence of counsel at trial. Seen as a freestanding sentence, Alabama further asserts, probation could be enforced, as a criminal fine or restitution order could, in a contempt proceeding. the decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama, Shelton argues that an indigent defendant may not receive a suspended We do That relaxed standard has no application here, where the question is whether the defendant may be jailed absent a conviction credited as reliable because the defendant had access to counsel.

Pa. Rule Crim. A suspended sentence is a prison term imposed for the offense of conviction. Rather, the critical point was that the defendant had a recognized right to counsel when adjudicated guilty of the felony offense for which he was imprisoned. Crim. 2002); Ore. Rev. By reversing Shelton's suspended sentence, the State informs us, the court also vacated the two-year term of probation. This is precisely what the Sixth Amendment, as interpreted in Argersinger and Scott, does not allow. Please keep in mind that this site makes no warranties as to the accuracy of the cases listed here or the current status of law. presented in this case. Texas's statute declares that appointed counsel should be offered to any defendant "charged with a misdemeanor punishable by confinement," Tex. 274 (CA5), vacated on other grounds, 414 U. S. 895 (1973); §7-6-102 (2001).

§967.06 (1998); Wyo. §51-296(a) (Supp. Pp.

Proc. Proc. It is thus the controlling rule that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense ...unless he was represented by counsel at his trial." Severing the analysis in this manner makes little sense. Thus, the defendant in Nichols had no right to appointed counsel in the DUI proceeding because he was not immediately imprisoned at the conclusion of that proceeding.

No. He was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court immediately suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. unless he was represented by counsel at his trial," Argersinger, 407 U. S., at 37. Nor do we agree with amicus or the dissent that our holding will "substantially limit the states' ability" to impose probation, Fried Brief 22, or encumber them with a "large, new burden," post, at 6-7. Fried Brief 23. Pp. (internal quotation marks omitted)). 532 U. S. 1018 (2001). This is precisely what the Sixth Amendment, as interpreted in Argersinger and Scott, does not allow. See Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae 8; cf. In answering the question we asked amicus to address--whether "the Sixth Amendment permit[s] activation of a suspended sentence upon the defendant's violation of the terms of probation"--the Court states without qualification that "it does not." See, e.g., Glover v. United States, 531 U. S. 198, 203 (2001) ("any amount of actual jail time has Sixth Amendment significance"); M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519 U. S. 102, 113 (1996); Nichols v. United States, 511 U. S. 738, 746 (1994) (constitutional line is "between criminal proceedings that resulted in imprisonment, and those that did not"); id., at 750 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment) ("The Court in Scott, relying on Argersinger[,] drew a bright line between imprisonment and lesser criminal penalties. Some have agreed with the decision would affect the constitutional calculus." Art. §§2709(a), (c)(1) (2000).

(Emphasis added.) 146, 149, 394 N. E. 2d 229, 231 (1979) (right to counsel in misdemeanor proceedings guaranteed by Ind.