An earlier treatment now outdated in several respects but still useful is Durfee, supra, note 114. 405, 406, 68 L.Ed. 3 (1948), which involved an attack under the Equal Protection Clause upon an Illinois election statute.
1, 20, 28 (Mr. Justice Johnson, concurring), 51 and 75, 8 L.Ed. Explicitly it begins with colegrove v. Green, supra, decided in 1946, but its roots run deep in the Court's historic adjudicatory process. 717. McGowan v. Maryland, supra. In this regard the appellants have proposed a plan based on the rationale of state-wide equal representation. Under the original 1944 Act, the rules provided that (subject to the exercise of the discretion respecting special geographical conditions and to regard for the total size of the House of Commons as prescribed by the Act) so far as practicable, the single-member districts should not deviate more than twenty-five percent from the electoral quota (population divided by number of constituencies). What he wrote was later to become the tradition, as expressed by Chief Justice Hughes in Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 401, 53 S.Ct.
For while the judiciary might be able to decide the limits of the meaning of 'republican form,' and thus the factor of lack of criteria might fall away, there would remain other possible barriers to decision because of primary commitment to another branch, which would have to be considered in the particular fact setting presented.
endobj Of course this Court was there precluded by the adequate state ground, and in dismissing the appeal, 352 U.S. 920, 77 S.Ct. VII, §§ 3, 4, where its effects have been inequalities of the order of eighty to one. And Matthews v. Handley, 361 U.S. 127, 80 S.Ct. The figures also showed a correlation with Federal Census figures for 1870. Finally, we msut consider if there are any appropriate modes of effective judicial relief. at 231. Similarly, the Equal Protection Clause was not invoked in Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors, 339 U.S. 940, 70 S.Ct. To demonstrate this requires no less than to analyze representative cases and to infer from them the analytical threads that make up the political question doctrine. 342, 344 345, 49 L.Ed. True, it must be clear that the Fourteenth Amendment claim is not so enmeshed with those political question elements which render Guaranty Clause claims nonjusticiable as actually to present a political question itself. 499, 18 L.Ed. Co. v. State of Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89, 21 S.Ct. 689. 1274; Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 38 S.Ct. 402, 76 L.Ed.
'Twenty-sixth district—Hardeman, McNairy, Hardin, Decatur and Benton. North Dakota does not in terms demand equality in House representation; members are to be assigned among the several senatorial districts, which are of equal population. 1, 93 L.Ed.
1014, with Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34—35, 65 S.Ct.
1082 and heard this Term. 1172 (claim that invalidation of state reapportionment statute per referendum negates republican government held nonjusticiable);49 Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 37 S.Ct.
II, § 3. Dyer v. Kazuhisa Abe, 138 F.Supp.
The towns felt themselves underrepresented, and agitation began for electoral reform.
The Civil Rights Act gives them authority to redress the deprivation 'under color of any State law' of any 'right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens * * *.'
Similarly, in 1961, the House directed the State Legislative Council to study methods of reapportionment. 481, 98 L.Ed. at 129. It would therefore appear that unless there is a contrary showing at the trial, appellants' current figures, taken from the United States Census Reports, are apposite. 162, 175—176, 22 L.Ed. It is, of course, a question of federal law. 7 & 8 Geo.
E.g., Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc., v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527—528, 79 S.Ct.
973, 91 L.Ed.
Dauer and Kelsay, supra, at 575, 587. 1385. 1070.'
Lastly, Colegrove v. Barrett, 330 U.S. 804, 67 S.Ct.
Matthews did affirm a judgment that may be read as a dismissal for want of jurisdiction, 179 F.Supp.
'A statute which is alleged to have worked unconstitutional deprivations of petitioners' rights is not immune to attack simply because the mechanism employed by the legislature is a redefinition of municipal boundaries. 446, 447, 71 L.Ed. ', 'Sec.
261, 262, 66 L.Ed.
The General Assembly thus apportioned has discriminated against the underrepresented counties and in favor of the overrepresented counties in the collection and distribution of various taxes and tax revenues, notably in the distribution of school and highway-improvement founds,8 this discrimination being 'made possible and effective' by the Legislature's failure to reapportion itself. (See the Appendix to this opinion.). <> And, as my Brother FRANKFURTER so conclusively proves (ante, 369 U.S., pp. V, § 4 (this was Virginia's Reconstruction-Act convention constitution); Miss.Const.1868, Art. Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 547—548, 44 S.Ct. It stated: 'It would be strange indeed, and doctrinaire, for this Court, applying such broad constitutional concepts as due process and equal protection of the laws, to deny a State the power to assure a proper diffusion of political initiative as between its thinly populated counties and those having concentrated masses, in view of the fact that the latter have practical opportunities for exerting their political weight at the polls not available to the former.'
The pattern suggested by the appellants in Exhibits 'A' and 'B' attached to their complaint is said to be a 'fair distribution' which accords with the Tennessee Constitution, and under which each of the election districts represents approximately equal voting population. 730, 731), rests on faulty mathematical foundations, but, more basically, because the approach taken wholly ignores all other factors justifying a legislative determination of the sort involved in devising a proper apportionment for a State Legislature. On the other hand, even in private litigation which directly implicates no feature of separation of powers, lack of judicially discoverable standards and the drive for even-handed application may impel reference to the political departments' determination of dates of hostilities' beginning and ending.
Today, only a dozen state constitutions provide for periodic legislative reapportionment of both houses by a substantially unqualified application of the population standard,129 and only about a dozen more prescribe such reapportionment for even a single chamber.
Foreign relations: There are sweeping statements to the effect that all questions touching foreign relations are political questions.31 Not only does resolution of such issues frequently turn on standards that defy judicial application, or involve the exercise of a discretion demonstrably committed to the executive or legislature;32 but many such questions uniquely demand single-voiced statement of the Government's views.33 Yet it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.
However, it refuses to award relief here although the facts are undisputed—and fails to give the District Court any guidance whatever. At last a compromise which gave the three hundred and twenty thousand people of the west thirteen senators, as against the nineteen senators returned by the three hundred sixty-three thousand people of the east, commanded agreement. Art.
725; and see 2 Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History (Rev. State-court adjudication does not involve the delicate problems of federal-state relations which would inhere in the exercise of federal judicial power to impose restrictions upon the States' shaping of their own governmental institutions.
1947).