3330, 77 L.Ed.2d 1019, which condoned a prayer exercise.

Tr. 2479, 86 L.Ed.2d 29 (1985), we held that an Alabama moment-of-silence statute passed for the sole purpose of "returning voluntary prayer to public schools," id., at 57, 105 S.Ct., at 2490, violated the Establishment Clause even though it did not encourage students to pray to any particular deity. As we have observed before, there are heightened concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and secondary public schools.

The considerations we have raised in objection to the invocation and benediction are in many respects similar to the arguments we considered in Marsh. . To do so would be an affront to the Rabbi who offered them and to all those for whom the prayers were an essential and profound recognition of divine authority. 2597, ----, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991) (SOUTER, J., concurring). KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BLACKMUN, STEVENS, O'CONNOR, and SOUTER, JJ., joined. 2356, 110 L.Ed.2d 191 (1990). Illustrations of this point have been amply provided in our prior opinions, but since the Court is so oblivious to our history as to suggest that the Constitution restricts “preservation and transmission of religious beliefs . Agreed Statement of Facts ¶ 38, id., at 17. 612, 669-670, and n. 127, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam ). . Why, then, does the Court treat them as though they were first graders? This argument cannot prevail, however. Pp. As the Court ably demonstrates, when the government "compose[s] official prayers," id., at 425, 82 S.Ct., at 1264, selects the member of the clergy to deliver the prayer, has the prayer delivered at a public school event that is planned, supervised and given by school officials, and pressures students to attend and participate in the prayer, there can be no doubt that the government is advancing and promoting religion.5 As our prior decisions teach us, it is this that the Constitution prohibits. 590-594. Divisiveness, of course, can attend any state decision respecting religions, and neither its existence nor its potential necessarily invalidates the State's attempts to accommodate religion in all cases. "Indeed, by 1787 the provisions of the state bills of rights had become what Madison called mere 'paper parchments' expressions of the most laudable sentiments, observed as much in the breach as in practice." . For without reference to those principles in other contexts, the controlling precedents as they relate to prayer and religious exercise in primary and secondary public schools compel the holding here that the policy of the city of Providence is an unconstitutional one.

And no doubt some persons who have no desire to join a prayer have little objection to standing as a sign of respect for those who do. While we may be unable to know for certain what the Framers meant by the Clause, we do know that, around the time of its ratification, a respectable body of opinion supported a considerably broader reading than petitioners urge upon us. Most recently, President Bush, continuing the tradition established by President Washington, asked those attending his inauguration to bow their heads, and made a prayer his first official act as President. Religious men and women of almost all denominations have felt it necessary to acknowledge and beseech the blessing of God as a people, and not just as individuals, because they believe in the "protection of divine Providence," as the Declaration of Independence put it, not just for individuals but for societies; because they believe God to be, as Washington's first Thanksgiving Proclamation put it, the "Great Lord and Ruler of Nations." We express no hostility to those aspirations, nor would our oath permit us to do so. . The reason for the choice of a rabbi is not disclosed by the record, but the potential for divisiveness over the choice of a particular member of the clergy to conduct the ceremony is apparent.

506, 507, 65 L.Ed. . H�|WKs�8��W�6���-17O�d=;��bM�!�DA3"��Î��_ Ařr� 5�F�ׯ_7W��E�h��_��"K!��*/QQ�,VY$��W!mG���^���(��곗����Q~��Q�^�.�xY�2I/Z����Y!���j���i꽿}������7�7�]%Q�N�l,6o��l��7_��q������o6���ln?�q-wE�R�. Many Americans who consider themselves religious are not Theistic; some, like several of the Framers, are Deists who would question Rabbi Gutterman's plea for divine advancement of the country's political and moral good.

.

But what exactly is this "fair and real sense"? Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92-93, and n. 127, 96 S.Ct. 728 F.Supp., at 74. of Grand Rapids, 473 U.S., at 389-392, 105 S.Ct., at 3225-3227; Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S., at 61, 105 S.Ct., at 2492; see also Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 De Paul L.Rev. The other "dominant fac[t]" identified by the Court is that "[s]tate officials direct the performance of a formal religious exercise" at school graduation ceremonies. .' Even that half of the disjunctive does not remotely establish a "participation" (or an "appearance of participation") in a religious exercise.

Ed. Sigmund Freud expressed it this way: "a religion, even if it calls itself the religion of love, must be hard and unloving to those who do not belong to it." “Certiorari” was the first word of such orders when they were written in Latin. James Madison, the principal author of the Bill of Rights, did not rest his opposition to a religious establishment on the sole ground of its effect on the minority. Application of these principles to the facts of this case is straightforward. 504, 91 L.Ed. The scope of the Establishment Clause's prohibitions developed in our case law derives from the Clause's purposes. Ed. It is a cornerstone principle of our Establishment Clause jurisprudence that "it is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government," Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425, 82 S.Ct. ); Corporation of Presiding Bishop, supra, 483 U.S., at 348, 107 S.Ct., at 2875 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment); see also Texas Monthly, supra, 489 U.S., at 18, 18-19, n. 8, 109 S.Ct., at 901, 901, n. 8 (plurality opinion); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S., at 57-58, n. 45, 105 S.Ct., at 2490, n. 45. 2479, 86 L.Ed.2d 29 (1985), we struck down a state law requiring a moment of silence in public classrooms not because the statute coerced students to participate in prayer (for it did not), but because the manner of its enactment "convey[ed] a message of state approval of prayer activities in the public schools." Implicit in their choice is the distinction between preferential and nonpreferential establishments, which the weight of evidence suggests the Framers appreciated. It is a tenet of the First Amendment that the State cannot require one of its citizens to forfeit his or her rights and benefits as the price of resisting conformance to state-sponsored religious practice. In Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 89 S.Ct. In Barnette we held that a public-school student could not be compelled to recite the Pledge; we did not even hint that she could not be compelled to observe respectful silence indeed, even to stand in respectful silence—when those who wished to recite it did so.

(Perhaps further intensive psychological research remains to be done on these matters.) Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid 882-883; see also Allegheny County v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 647-648, 109 S.Ct.

And the State may not place the student dissenter in the dilemma of participating or protesting.

4. "The graduates now need strength and guidance for the future, help them to understand that we are not complete with academic knowledge alone. . . May those we honor this morning always turn to it in trust.

According to the Court, students at graduation who want “to avoid the fact or appearance of participation” in the invocation and benediction are psychologically obligated by “public pressure, as well as peer pressure, . . "[B]ut when a religion contracts an alliance of this nature, I do not hesitate to affirm that it commits the same error as a man who should sacrifice his future to his present welfare; and in obtaining a power to which it has no claim, it risks that authority which is rightfully its own." (a) This Court need not revisit the questions of the definition and scope of the principles governing the extent of permitted accommodation by the State for its citizens' religious beliefs and practices, for the controlling precedents as they relate to prayer and religious exercise in primary and secondary public schools compel the holding here. . of Ed. To characterize the "subtle coercive pressures," ante, at 588, allegedly present here as the "practical" equivalent of the legal sanctions in Barnette is . The school board (and the United States, which supports it as amicus curiae ) argued that these short prayers and others like them at graduation exercises are of profound meaning to many students and parents throughout this country who consider that due respect and acknowledgement for divine guidance and for the deepest spiritual aspirations of our people ought to be expressed at an event as important in life as a graduation.

Learn vocabulary, terms, and more with flashcards, games, and other study tools. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673, 104 S.Ct. Because the schools' opening exercises were government-sponsored religious ceremonies, the Court found that the primary effect was the advancement of religion and held, therefore, that the activity violated the Establishment Clause. 1 Documentary History, supra, at 151 (Senate Journal). 1355, 1359, 79 L.Ed.2d 604 (1984). The First Amendment protects speech and religion by quite different mechanisms.

It overlooks a fundamental dynamic of the Constitution.

We find it unnecessary to address Daniel Weisman's taxpayer standing, for a live and justiciable controversy is before us. Thus, a literal application of the coercion test would render the Establishment Clause a virtual nullity, as petitioners' counsel essentially conceded at oral argument. Ed. . 2479, 2512-2514, 86 L.Ed.2d 29 (1985) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 446-450, and n. 3, 82 S.Ct. . ("In any particular case the critical question is whether the circumference of legislation encircles a class so broad that it can be fairly concluded that religious institutions could be thought to fall within the natural perimeter"). At a high school graduation, teachers and principals must and do retain a high degree of control over the precise contents of the program, the speeches, the timing, the movements, the dress, and the decorum of the students. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613, 91 S.Ct. Beyond the fact, stipulated to by the parties, that attendance at graduation is voluntary, there is nothing in the record to indicate that failure of attending students to take part in the invocation or benediction was subject to any penalty or discipline. And they also knew that nothing, absolutely nothing, is so inclined to foster among religious believers of various faiths a toleration—no, an affection—for one another than voluntarily joining in prayer together, to the God whom they all worship and seek.

2 and 3, 104 S.Ct., at 1360, and nn. 711 (1947). 1 C. Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 469 (1922).

[9] Moreover, since the Pledge of Allegiance has been revised since Barnette to include the phrase “under God,” recital of the Pledge would appear to raise the same Establishment Clause issue as the invocation and benediction.

3330, 77 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983), held that benedictions and invocations at public school graduations are not always unconstitutional.