2d 70 (1962). Reese did not address the specific issue of whether a defendant who receives a suspended or probated sentence, but is not actually imprisoned, for a misdemeanor conviction is entitled to counsel. The question pre-sented is whether the Sixth Amendment right to appointed 2d 1004 (Ala.Crim. Constitutional IssueThe question presented to the Court was whether an indigent defendant charged with a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment but where the jail sentence was suspended is entitled to the assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. In district court Lereed Shelton was convicted of assault in the third degree, a violation of § 13A-6-22, Ala.Code 1975. See Lake v. City of Birmingham, 390 So. Consequently, I respectfully dissent. 2d 1315, 1317 (Ala. Crim.App.1985). We must determine whether the defendant effectively waived his right to counsel in this case. *97 William H. Mills of Redden, Mills & Clark, Birmingham, for petitioner.

MCLE credit will be over 30 hours.If you have any additional questions or concerns, please contact Lubna, lubna@azcapitalproject.org. HOOPER, C.J., and HOUSTON, COOK, LYONS, and ENGLAND, JJ., concur. 8 0 obj Defendant-respondent LeReed Shelton, convicted of third-degree assault, was sentenced to a jail term of 30 days, which the trial court immediately suspended, placing Shelton on probation for two years. The trial judge's admonitions to Shelton to the effect that he needed a lawyer are a far cry from explanations of the right to counsel or offers of appointed counsel if Shelton could not afford to retain counsel.

2d 383 (1979), held that Shelton did not have a constitutional right to counsel because his sentence was suspended and he was not actually imprisoned. The sentence of the trial court imposed 30 days' imprisonment, a $500 fine, restitution of $516.69 payable to the victim, and court costs. 00-1214, Alabama v. LeReed Shelton. The trial court, however, suspended the 30 days' imprisonment, placed Shelton on probation, and imposed certain conditions, including timely payment of the sums ordered. Likewise the record fails to establish any of the three factors required by Jenkins, supra. Please visit NAPD's website to see more information about all of their upcoming trainings and events.

We do not conclude that a defendant convicted of a petty or misdemeanor offense can establish a violation of his right to counsel when the defendant has not been sentenced to a term of imprisonment. $�e ���E�"bDT@y��hi In district court Lereed Shelton was convicted of assault in the third degree, a violation of § 13A-6-22, Ala.Code 1975. Under the facts of this case, I am reluctant to question the judgment of the trial court. P., motion, he petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. "Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. Drawing on the rationale of Argersinger, the Court held that a suspended sentence that may end up in the actual deprivation of a person's liberty may not be imposed unless the defendant was accorded the guiding hand of counsel in the prosecution for the crime charged. The defendant was fined $50, but was not sentenced to any term of imprisonment. The record does not contain evidence that anyone told Shelton that the trial court would appoint a lawyer to represent him if he could not afford one.

http://azcapitalproject.org/death-penalty-college/. atty. H�t�yPS��O$ !H��!E���X�VE@e Ex parte Lereed SHELTON. No. [3] We note further that the holding of the Court of Criminal Appeals in Benson v. City of Sheffield, 737 So. Alabama v. Shelton Case Brief - Rule of Law: Under the Sixth Amendment, a suspended sentence that may result in an actual deprivation of a defendant's liberty %PDF-1.4 We granted Shelton's petition to determine the following: 1) whether Shelton had a constitutional right to counsel even though he was never actually imprisoned; 2) whether Shelton knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel; and 3) whether the trial court denied Shelton his right to a restitution hearing in violation of § 15-18-67, Ala.Code 1975. Perkins v. State, 715 So. A defendant may not be imprisoned for any offense, whether a petty, misdemeanor, or felony offense, unless the defendant either had counsel or made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel. I��ZT�|6�9"�il��|0)�7�^���4�p�+�K�����J�hW�?�ܮe�A�ۨo�����SX�4�E(=a���v��u��Z�c��a�H!j�ū� ?��K�� ]ߝ;?S�ɗ�#��h�� On the other hand, other courts have held that an indigent defendant who receives a conditionally suspended or probated sentence to imprisonment is entitled to representation by appointed counsel because that defendant has been "sentenced to a term of imprisonment." 2d 357, 359 (Ala.1984) (holding that defendant's argument regarding the amount of restitution ordered was preserved for appellate review even though defendant did not object during the restitution hearing because defense counsel "made known to the [trial] court his disagreement with the State concerning the amount of restitution"). 5 0 obj He was convicted and sentenced to 30 days in jail. In its May 2000 ruling, the Alabama court vacated a 30-day suspended sentence and a two-year term of probation for LeReed Shelton, who had represented himself on … 2d 209 (Ala.1996). He was convicted and sentenced to 30 days in jail. The Supreme To apply or for more information, please go to the website: http://azcapitalproject.org/death-penalty-college/. 2d at 581. He did not make any argument that the restitution was not supported by the evidence. Decided May 20, 2002. 2d 530 (1972), and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 99 S. Ct. 1158, 59 L. Ed. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516, 82 S. Ct. 884, 8 L. Ed.
Shelton had ample opportunity to present evidence to dispute the restitution amount. United States v. Reilley, 948 F.2d 648 (10th Cir.
gen., for respondent. The Court held that, because the defendant had been imprisoned and had suffered an actual loss of liberty, he was entitled to representation by counsel. The district court ordered him to pay a $500 fine and $333.75 as restitution to the victim. The College fosters cooperation and community among participants and faculty united in the common goal of effectively representing capitally charged clients and saving clients’ lives. Therefore, *102 we cannot say that Shelton intelligently and understandingly waived his right to counsel. Furthermore, we hold that the Court of Criminal Appeals improperly overruled Williams v. City of Phenix City, 659 So. William H. Pryor, Jr., atty.