No. If this claim were presented, however, I would, consistent with my dissent in Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U. S. 162, 476 U. S. 203-206 (1986), hold that separate juries for the guilt and sentencing issues should be empaneled, or that alternate jurors should be provided so that death qualification could occur only after a decision had been reached on the defendant's guilt or innocence on all alleged offenses. at 451 U. S. 470-471, and n. 15. Impulse controls under even minimal stress are felt to be very poor. 1986). of Oral Arg. Today's extension of that holding to permit death qualification in a joint trial, where not all of the defendants face capital charges, compels me to dissent again. Id. I dissented from this Court's holding in Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U. S. 162 (1986), that "death-qualifying" a jury in a capital case before the guilt phase of the trial was constitutionally permissible. On cross-examination, the prosecutor attempted to rebut this defense by having the social worker read from another evaluation prepared by Dr. Robert J. G. Lange on the joint motion of the prosecution and counsel for petitioner following his murder arrest. Tr.

Id., at 179. In Estelle v. Smith, Not persuaded by petitioner's arguments, the court permitted Elam to read an edited version of the report, [Footnote 12] with the observation that, "you can't argue about his mental status at the time of the commitment of this offense and exclude evidence when he was evaluated with reference to that mental status. Petitioner, however, misconceives the nature of the Sixth Amendment right at issue here by focusing on the use of Doctor Lange's report rather than on the proper concern of this Amendment, the consultation with counsel, which petitioner undoubtedly had. 44, would be to have one jury for the guilt phase for both defendants and for the penalty phase for petitioner (this jury being not "death qualified") and another "death-qualified" jury for the penalty phase for the capital defendant. The justifications for using a single jury were to avoid repetitive proceedings and to ensure that the capital defendant benefited at sentencing from any "residual doubt" regarding his guilt. Where, as here, a defendant requests a psychological evaluation or presents psychiatric evidence, the prosecution may rebut this presentation with the report of the requested examination without implicating the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination.

Rule 9.12 states in pertinent part: "The court may order two (2) or more indictments, informations, complaints or uniform citations to be tried together if the offenses, and the defendants, if more than one (1), could have been joined in a single indictment, information, complaint or uniform citation. 16. [483 399 (Aug. 2-13, 1982). 844, 872, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). Id., at 1031. In his brief, petitioner advances three additional claims: (1) an alleged violation of the First Amendment rights of the jurors not selected for his jury; (2) an alleged equal protection violation with respect to those jurors; and (3) a challenge to the actual "death-qualification" procedure used in this case. U.S. 402, 411] Lange while petitioner was within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court after his arrest for Poore's murder. This information was irrelevant to the issue on which it was admitted and, more importantly, was obtained for therapeutic purposes that can only be undermined by the Court's decision today. 469 Here, in contrast, petitioner’s counsel himself requested the psychiatric evaluation by Doctor Lange. The Court considered a similar claim in McCree that was directed at the exclusion of such jurors [483 U.S. 402, 417]   prior to the guilt phase of a capital defendant’s trial.

 

No interest of the Commonwealth of Kentucky justified the invasion of petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights when potential jurors were excluded on the basis of their answers to questions about an issue that was totally unrelated to the exclusively noncapital charges on which he was tried. [ Id., at 26-27. Id., at 65. "Buchanan v. For the sake of shorthand, see Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. of Oral Arg. These options equal or exceed in severity the possible sentences the noncapital defendant may receive. I cannot accept the Court's invocation of a perceived burden, totally unmeasured, in order to justify petitioner's trial before an uncommonly conviction-prone jury. Petitioner's suggested alternatives would, therefore, not produce unreliable or inconsistent assessments of guilt or of culpability for sentencing purposes. -206 (1986), hold that separate juries for the guilt and sentencing issues should be empaneled, or that alternate jurors should be provided so that death qualification could occur only after a decision had been reached on the defendant's guilt or innocence on all alleged offenses.

Stat. U.S. 402, 424] Where, however, a defendant places his mental status at issue and thus relies upon reports of psychological examinations, he should expect that the results of such reports may be used by the prosecutor in rebuttal. ] Petitioner argues that the jury may have been confused by the introduction of a report dealing with his competency to stand trial, a very different issue from his mental condition at the time of the crime that was the focus of his extreme-emotional-disturbance defense. 383 The present Kentucky procedure, not available at the time of petitioner's trial, provides for a separate sentencing hearing before the jury with the presentation of specific evidence by the Commonwealth, such as the defendant's prior acts, and of mitigating evidence by the defendant. The sentencing alternatives for the convicted capital defendant are life and death. After telling Johnson to continue to wait, id. Petr and a codefendant were charged with raping and murdering a gas station attendant, and were tried together. The evidence is "overwhelming" that death-qualified juries are "substantially more likely to convict or to convict on more serious charges than juries on which unalterable opponents of capital punishment are permitted to serve." In Estelle v. Smith, we also concluded that Smith's Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel had been violated. These reports tended to establish that he had suffered from emotional disturbance, and had been in need of treatment. [483 As it is, there is some conflict between these alternatives that reflects petitioner's ambiguity as to the exact nature of the relief he seeks: it is unclear whether he wishes to avoid a "death qualified" jury at the guilt phase, the penalty phase, or both. On the other hand, there is the alternative, also acknowledged by petitioner at oral argument, see id. No interest of the Commonwealth justifies death qualification before the guilt phase in a trial against a capital defendant, and a fortiori no interest justifies death qualification of a jury that is to decide issues affecting a noncapital defendant in a joint capital trial.

at 72, such remarks only would have reinforced comments in earlier reports. 990 (1977), which, at the time, governed involuntary hospitalization for psychiatric treatment. App.19, 22. Where, as here, a defendant requests a psychological evaluation or presents psychiatric evidence, the prosecution may rebut this presentation with the report of the requested examination without implicating the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination.

21 Justia makes no guarantees or warranties that the annotations are accurate or reflect the current state of law, and no annotation is intended to be, nor should it be construed as, legal advice. 3. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Kentucky is affirmed. Id., at 76-77.

Moreover, in Kentucky the prosecutor can seek the death penalty only in a special class of capital cases where a statutory aggravating factor is present. "[Petitioner's] emotional disturbance and his resentment of his placement at the Danville Youth Development Center appear to militate against his success in this program." Id., at 484, 1033. Id., at 213.

See, e.g., id.

[Footnote 19]. There is no danger that the noncapital defendant would be punished more severely than the capital defendant. Footnote 20 ] In Enmund, this Court held that the death penalty would be invalid, under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, for an individual "who aids and abets a felony in the course of which a murder is committed by others but who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be employed."