2955, 2982, 37 L.Ed.2d 948 (1973), I have long disagreed with the Court's interpretation and application of the Establishment Clause in the context of state aid to private schools. Pp.

THE ACTIVITY IN THIS ROOM IS CONTROLLED SOLELY BY THE GRAND RAPIDS PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT." There is no evidence that any public school student has ever attended a Shared Time or Community Education class in a nonpublic school. 192, 66 L.Ed.2d 199 (1980) (per curiam); Meek v. Pittenger, supra, 421 U.S., at 370, 95 S.Ct., at 1765; Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, 403 U.S., at 619, 91 S.Ct., at 2114 ("The State must be certain, given the Religion Clauses, that subsidized teachers do not inculcate religion"); Levitt v. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 480, 93 S.Ct.

Which of the following Supreme Court cases is most relevant to this statement? But we have never indulged a similar assumption with respect to prayers conducted at the opening of the schoolday. The doctrine of stare decisis is significant for which of the following reasons? The danger arises "not because the public employee [is] likely deliberately to subvert his task to the service of religion, but rather because the pressures of the environment might alter his behavior from its normal course."

The government's activities in this area can have a magnified impact on impressionable young minds, and the occasional rivalry of parallel public and private school systems offers an all-too-ready opportunity for divisive rifts along religious lines in the body politic.

Id., at 1078. 649 (1948). Grappling with problems in many ways parallel to those we face today, McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 68 S.Ct. In The Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton states, "A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. The solution to this problem adopted by the Framers and consistently recognized by this Court is jealously to guard the right of every individual to worship according to the dictates of conscience while requiring the government to maintain a course of neutrality among religions, and between religion and nonreligion. Although petitioners label the Shared Time and Community Education students as "part-time public school students," the students attending Shared Time and Community Education courses in facilities leased from a nonpublic school are the same students who attend that particular school otherwise.

A person wears a necklace bearing a Christian cross to work. However, after the District Court found for respondents and enjoined the further operation of the programs, petitioners did not appeal the decision to the extent that it involved "physical education and industrial arts shared time classes at the secondary level and community education classes at the secondary level." Although Shared Time itself is a program offered only in the nonpublic schools, there was testimony that the courses included in that program are offered, albeit perhaps in a somewhat different form, in the public schools as well.

Contrary to the law and the teachers' promises, they are assumed to be eager inculcators of religious dogma, see ante, at 387-389, requiring, in the Court's words, "ongoing inspection." Forty of the forty-one schools at which the programs operate are sectarian in character.4 The schools of course vary from one another, but substantial evidence suggests that they share deep religious purposes. Nothing in the record indicates that Shared Time instructors have attempted to proselytize their students. Meek, supra, 421 U.S., at 364, 95 S.Ct., at 1763; Wolman, supra, 433 U.S., at 248-251, 97 S.Ct., at 2605-2607. I agree with the Court, however, that the Community Education program violates the Establishment Clause.

84-237, Aguilar et al. After spending the balance of their schoolday in classes heavily influenced by a religious perspective, they would have little motivation or ability to discern improper ideological content that may creep into a Shared Time or Community Education course. 546 F.Supp., at 1080-1084.

2868, 2870, 37 L.Ed.2d 923 (1973); Meek v. Pittenger, supra, 421 U.S., at 366, 95 S.Ct., at 1763 ("The very purpose of many of those schools is to provide an integrated secular and religious education"); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S., at 671, 90 S.Ct., at 1412 ("to assure future adherents to a particular faith" is "an affirmative if not dominant policy of church schools"). Petitioners alleged that respondents lacked taxpayer standing under Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. . "6 Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, 403 U.S., at 657, 91 S.Ct., at 2133 (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). The Director works out an academic schedule for each school, taking into account, inter alia, the varying religious holidays celebrated by the schools of different denominations. 1071, 1078 (WD Mich.1982).

3062, 77 L.Ed.2d 721 (1983), which upheld a general tax deduction available to parents of all schoolchildren for school expenses, including tuition to religious schools. The District Court found that the schools are "pervasively sectarian," id., at 1096, n. 13, and concluded "without hesitation that the purposes of these schools is to advance their particular religions," id., at 1096, and that "a substantial portion of their functions are subsumed in the religious mission."

In the programs challenged in this case, the religious school students spend their typical schoolday moving between religious school and "public school" classes. 840, 63 L.Ed.2d 94 (1980), or diagnostic services, Wolman v. Walter, supra, 433 U.S., at 241-244, 97 S.Ct., at 2601-2603, there is a "substantial risk" that programs operating in this environment would "be used for religious educational purposes." Many of the schools in this case include prayer and attendance at religious services as a part of their curriculum, are run by churches or other organizations whose members must subscribe to particular religious tenets, have faculties and student bodies composed largely of adherents of the particular denomination, and give preference in attendance to children belonging to the denomination.

The signs read as follows: "GRAND RAPIDS PUBLIC SCHOOLS' ROOM. v. Felton et al., No. We therefore reaffirm that state action alleged to violate the Establishment Clause should be measured against the Lemon criteria. Wikipedia . The Court of Appeals of course recognized that respondents adduced no evidence of specific incidents of religious indoctrination in this case.

Wolman v. Walter, supra, at 264, 97 S.Ct., at 2614 (opinion of POWELL, J.). At the religious schools here—as at the sectarian schools that have been the subject of our past cases—"the secular education those schools provide goes hand in hand with the religious mission that is the only reason for the schools' existence.

We do not question that the dedicated and professional religious schoolteachers employed by the Community Education program will attempt in good faith to perform their secular mission conscientiously. Engel brought suit claiming such a practice violated the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause and petitioned to the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216-217, 83 S.Ct.