U.S. 218, 222 ante, at 604-605, n. 19. The content of his truthful answer supported an inference that his mental faculties were impaired, because his assertion (he did not know the date of his sixth birthday) was different from the assertion (he knew the date was (correct date)) that the trier of fact might reasonably have expected a lucid person to provide. Indeed, as the Court acknowledges, Muniz did in fact "stumbl[e] over his address and age," ante, at 586; more specifically, he was unable to give his address without looking at his license and initially told police the wrong age. dexterity tests and discussing the breathalyzer test "are precisely the sort of testimonial evidence that we expressly protected in [previous cases]," id., at 390, 547 A. U.S. 582, 593] (1988). [496

Innis, supra, at 302, n. 8. 7. All of these holdings were based on Justice Holmes' opinion in Holt v. United States, U.S. 291, 300 427 U.S. 582, 604] 218

which [the Court already found to be] nontestimonial [evidence]."

10 Moreover, while performing these tests, Muniz "attempted to explain his difficulties in performing the various tasks, and often requested further clarification of the tasks he was to perform." After the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the Commonwealth's application for review, 522 Pa. 575, 559 A. truthfully or falsely revealing their thoughts. The state court is free, of course, to consider this question upon remand. [496 Read our student testimonials. Thus, custodial interrogation for purposes of Miranda includes both express questioning and words or actions that, given the officer's knowledge of any special susceptibilities of the suspect, the officer knows or reasonably should know are likely to "have . 378

You’ll be in good company: Quimbee is one of the most widely used and trusted sites for law students, serving more than 97,000 law students since 2011. U.S. 1, 7 Footnote 4 U.S. 609, 615 Whenever a suspect is asked for a response requiring him to communicate an express or implied assertion of fact or belief,

[496 377 Pa. [ .

J. Michael Eakin argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. Moreover, the Innis Court emphasized that the officers' knowledge of any "unusual susceptibility" of a suspect to a particular means of eliciting information is relevant to the question whether they should have known that their conduct was reasonably likely to elicit Unless a suspect "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently" waives these rights, ibid., any incriminating responses to questioning may not be introduced into evidence in the prosecution's case in chief in a subsequent criminal proceeding. -267 (1967). The rule of law is the black letter law upon which the court rested its decision. Super., at 390, 547 A. 87-1241.

U.S. 582, 602] U.S. 1 In my view, however, the circumstances of this case - in particular, Muniz's apparent intoxication - rendered the officers' words and actions the "functional equivalent" of express questioning Ibid. C-5 - C-6.

The critical point is that the Commonwealth had an investigatory interest in Muniz's assertion of belief that was communicated by his answer to the question. Please try again. U.S. 582, 592] But given the fact that five members of the Court agree that Muniz's response to the sixth birthday question should have been suppressed, I agree that the judgment of the Superior Court should be vacated so that, on remand, the court may consider whether admission of the response at trial was harmless error. , regardless of whether the question is "designed" to elicit an incriminating response. Id., at 764. Quimbee is a company hell-bent on one thing: helping you get an “A” in every course you take in law school, so you can graduate at the top of your class and get a high-paying law job. At worst, he might utter a mistaken guess. As the Court held in Innis, however, the focus in the "functional equivalent" inquiry is on "the perceptions of the suspect," not on the officers' conduct viewed in isolation. 1981); State v. Arsenault, 115 N. H. 109, 336 A. Similarly, we conclude that Miranda does not require suppression of the statements Muniz made when asked to submit to a breathalyzer examination. (1979); Perkins, ante, at 308-309 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Neville, supra, at 562-564. .

[496   ] Under Pennsylvania law, driving under the influence of alcohol consists of driving while intoxicated to a degree "`which substantially impairs [the suspect's] judgment, or clearness of intellect, or any of the normal faculties essential to the safe operation of an automobile.'" [496 We recently explained in Doe v. United States, The issue section includes the dispositive legal issue in the case phrased as a question.

388 Footnote 2

] The Commonwealth could not use Muniz's failure to count against him regardless of whether his silence during the walk and turn test was itself testimonial in those circumstances.

Footnote 12 In addition, although I agree with the conclusion in Part III-C that the seven "booking" questions should not be suppressed, I do so for a reason different from that of JUSTICE BRENNAN. Footnote 7 . 2d, at 387). [ . U.S., at 301 In subsequent questioning, he admitted to being under the influence of alcohol. U.S. 520, 531 We noted that in Holt v. United States, U.S. 582, 615] [496 U.S., at 212 [496 .   After the officer pursued Muniz down the highway and pulled him over, the officer asked Muniz to perform three standard field sobriety tests: a "horizontal gaze nystagmus" test, a "walk and turn" test, and a "one leg stand" test. Because Muniz was not informed of his Miranda rights prior to the tests, those responses also should have been suppressed.

Because Muniz finished the tests in approximately 6 minutes, the police required him to wait another 14 minutes before they asked him to submit to the breathalyzer examination. [496 U.S. 520, 526 U.S. 582, 601] As explained above, the Innis test focuses primarily upon "the perspective of the suspect." The case was ultimately appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court. U.S. 582, 585].

Super., at 390, 547 A. U.S. 582, 610]

487 410 Under Schmerber and its progeny, we agree with the Commonwealth that any slurring of speech and other evidence of lack of muscular coordination revealed by Muniz's responses to Officer Hosterman's direct questions constitute nontestimonial components of those responses. The officer arrested Muniz and took him to a booking center, where he was told that his actions and voice were being recorded, but no one read him his Miranda rights. Super., at 387, 547 A. U.S. 436 In this case, the question is not whether a suspect's "impaired mental faculties" can fairly be characterized as an aspect of his physiology, but rather whether Muniz's response

  U.S. 436 2d, at 422 (quoting Commonwealth v. Benson, 280 Pa. (citation omitted), that defined the operation of the Star Chamber, wherein suspects were forced to choose between revealing incriminating private thoughts and forsaking their oath by committing perjury. ] This conclusion is in accord with that of many other state courts, which have reasoned that standard sobriety tests measuring reflexes, dexterity, and balance do not require the performance of testimonial acts. 20 Get Pennsylvania Railroad v. Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333 (1933), United States Supreme Court, case facts, key issues, and holdings and reasonings online today. (1988). law school study materials, including 726 video lessons and 5,100+ First, as a factual matter, Muniz's responses were incriminating for a reason other than his apparent slurring. 384 U.S., at 765 Furthermore, that question would not fall within JUSTICE BRENNAN's proposed routine booking question exception. With respect to Muniz's verbal statements, however, the court concluded that "none of Muniz's utterances were spontaneous, voluntary verbalizations," 377 Pa. Muniz was left with the choice of incriminating himself by admitting that he did not then know the date of his sixth birthday, or answering untruthfully by reporting a date that he did not then believe to be accurate (an incorrect guess would be incriminating as well as untruthful). ("[T]he blood test evidence . Using this "helpful framework for analysis," ibid., we held that a person suspected of driving while intoxicated could be forced to provide a blood sample, because that sample was "real or physical evidence" outside the scope of the privilege and the sample was obtained in a manner by which "[p]etitioner's testimonial capacities were in no way implicated." 2d, at 423. [496 U.S. 582, 599] Even if Muniz had not skipped "two," his failure to complete the count was incriminating in itself. Id., at 252-253. We therefore need not decide today whether Muniz's counting (or not counting) itself was "testimonial" within the meaning of the privilege. U.S., at 215 Id., at 467. Id., at 213, n. 11. Id., at 478. Ante, at 598-599, and n. 12.

Some law schools—such as Yale, Vanderbilt, Berkeley, and the University of Illinois—even subscribe directly to Quimbee for all their law students. 384 *. 13-19 (testimony of Officer Spotts), from Muniz's failure of the three roadside sobriety tests, id., at 19, and from their own observations - that Muniz was intoxicated. This website requires JavaScript. Footnote 10 384 Footnote 3 Begin typing to search, use arrow keys to navigate, use enter to select. 1   We agree with the Commonwealth's contention that Muniz's answers are not rendered inadmissible by Miranda merely because the slurred nature of his speech was incriminating. During the second phase of the videotaped proceedings, Officer Hosterman asked Muniz to perform the same three sobriety tests that he had earlier performed at roadside prior to his arrest: the "horizontal gaze nystagmus" test, the "walk and turn" test, and the "one leg stand" test. Muniz likewise might have attempted to guess the correct response to the sixth birthday question instead of attempting to calculate the date or answer "I don't know." He then answered seven questions regarding his name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and current age, stumbling over two responses. As did Officer Hosterman when administering the three physical sobriety tests, see supra, at 603-604, Officer Deyo carefully limited her role to providing Muniz with relevant information about the breathalyzer test and the Implied Consent Law.

[ All rights reserved. U.S. 582, 588] See also Illinois v. Perkins, ante, p. 292 (creating exception to Miranda for custodial interrogation by an undercover police officer posing as the suspect's fellow prison inmate). [ See Michigan v. Long, In United States v. Wade, Had the suspect been asked to provide a writing sample of his own composition, the content of the writing would have reflected his assertion of facts or beliefs and hence would have been testimonial; but in Gilbert "[n]o claim [was] made that the content of the exemplars was testimonial or communicative matter." Id., at C-6, quoting Commonwealth v. Benson, 280 Pa. Super. ; our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to the innocent."'". Whatever All of Muniz's responses during the videotaped session were prompted by questions that sought testimonial answers during the course of custodial interrogation. 2 U.S. 582, 586] [496 U.S., at 476 . [496 . that the police should know is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response, cf. [496