If we yielded to this contention of the plaintiff in error we should render the sections invalid by giving them a strained construction, which would make them antagonistic to the law of Congress. . But, as already stated, we think, The bill of exceptions taken upon the trial set out all the evidence, from which it appeared that Presser was thirty-one years old, a citizen of the United States and of the State of Illinois, and a voter; that he belonged to a society called the Lehr und Wehr Verein, a corporation organized April 16, 1875, in due form, under chapter 32, Revised Statutes of Illinois, called the General Incorporation Laws of Illinois, "for the purpose," as expressed by its certificate of association, "of improving the mental and bodily condition of its members, so as to qualify them for the duties of citizens of a republic. But a conclusive answer to the contention that this amendment prohibits the legislation in question lies in the fact that the amendment is a limitation only upon the power of Congress and the National government, and not upon that of the States. Creating a unique profile web page containing interviews, posts, articles, as well as the cases you have appeared in, greatly enhances your digital presence on search engines such Google and Bing, resulting in increased client interest. See also Trade Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82. It is next contended by the plaintiff in error that sections 5 and 6 of Art. abridging . 271, the act of February 28, 1795, "to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions," 1 Stat.

393, 580; United States v. Cruikshank, cited above. But it was held in the same case that the right peaceably to assemble was not protected by the clause referred to, unless the purpose of the assembly was to petition the government for a redress of grievances.
This is a right which it was held in, It is undoubtedly true that all citizens capable of bearing arms constitute the reserved military force or reserve militia of the United States as well as of the States, and, in view of this prerogative of the general government, as well as of its general powers, the States cannot, even laying the constitutional provision in question out of view, prohibit the people from keeping and bearing arms, so as to deprive the United States of their rightful resource for maintaining the public security, and disable the people from performing their duty to the general government. We are therefore of opinion that fairly construed the sections of the Military Code referred to do not conflict with the laws of Congress on the subject of the militia. §§ 5298, 5299. A State statute providing that all able-bodied male citizens of the State between eighteen and forty-five, except those exempted, shall be subject to military duty, and shall be enrolled and designated as the State militia, and prohibiting all bodies of men other than the regularly organized volunteer militia of the State and the troops of the United States from associating together as military organizations, or drilling or parading with arms in any city of the State without license from the governor, as to these provisions is constitutional and does not infringe the laws of the United States: and it is sustained as to them, although the act contains other provisions, separable from the foregoing, which it was contended infringed upon the powers vested in the United States by the Constitution, or upon laws enacted by Congress in pursuance thereof. Interact directly with CaseMine users looking for advocates in your area of specialization. ", Art. For, as was said by this court in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 560, 551, the government of the United States, although it is "within the scope of its powers supreme and above the States," "can neither grant nor secure to its citizens any right or privilege not expressly or by implication placed under its jurisdiction." Unless restrained by their own Constitutions, State legislatures may enact statutes to control and regulate all organizations, drilling, and parading of military bodies and associations, except those which are authorized by the militia laws of the United States. The argument of the plaintiff in error that the legislation mentioned deprives him of either life, liberty or property without due process of law, or that it is a bill of attainder or ex post facto law, is so clearly untenable as to require no discussion. The plaintiff in error was not a member of the organized volunteer militia of the State of Illinois, nor did he belong to the troops of the United States or to any organization under the militia law of the United States.

10. Military organization and military drill and parade under arms are subjects especially under the control of the government of every country. The clauses of the Constitution of the United States referred to in the assignments of error, were as follows: Art.

of the Military Code, under which he was indicted, are in conflict with the acts of Congress for the organization of the militia. ", The plaintiff in error also contended that the enactment of the 5th and 6th sections of Article XI.

Military organization and military drill and parade under arms are subjects especially under the control of the government of every country. of the Military Code, We have not found it necessary to consider or decide the question thus raised, as to the validity of the entire Military Code of Illinois, for, in our opinion, the sections under which the plaintiff in error was convicted may be valid, even if the other sections of the act were invalid. Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80; Penniman's Case, 103 U.S. 714, 717; Unity v. Burrage, 103 U.S. 459. On the contrary, the fact that he did not belong to the organized militia or the troops of the United States was an ingredient in the offence for which he was convicted and sentenced. That is a remarkable statement, as Sturges v. Crowninshield, was decided a year before Houston v. Moore. 271, the act of February 28, 1795, "to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions," 1 Stat. The only clause in the Constitution which, upon any pretence, could be said to have any relation whatever to his right to associate with others as a military company is found in the First Amendment, which declares that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging ... the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for a redress of grievances."

See Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. On the other hand, it is said that the State law makes it unlawful for any of its able-bodied citizens, except eight thousand, called the Illinois National Guard, to associate themselves together as a military company, or to drill or parade with arms without the license of the governor, and declares that no military company shall leave the State with arms and equipments without his consent; that even the eight thousand men, styled the Illinois National Guard, are not enrolled or organized as required by the act of Congress, nor are they subject to the call of the President, but they constitute a military force sworn to serve in the military service of the State, to obey the orders of the governor, and not to leave the State without his consent; and that, if the State act is valid, the national act providing for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia is of no force in the State of Illinois, for the Illinois act, so far from being in harmony with the act of Congress, is an insurmountable obstacle to its execution. "All that cannot be so granted or so secured are left to the exclusive protection of the State.".
A State may pass laws to regulate the privileges and immunities of its own citizens, provided that in so doing it does not abridge their privileges and immunities as citizens of the United States. Woods: …activities of individuals, and in Presser v. Illinois, which declared that the Bill of Rights limited the power of the federal, but not a state, government. It is clear that their object was to forbid voluntary military associations, unauthorized by law, from organizing or *269 drilling and parading with arms in the cities or towns of the State, and not to interfere with the organization, arming and drilling of the militia under the authority of the acts of Congress. the militia organized in pursuance of the act of Congress, the Illinois National Guard, in its organization, arming, and the purpose for which it is organized, contravenes the spirit and intent of the national act, and if permitted to stand, it prevents the organizing, arming and disciplining all the male citizens of the State, as Congress has prescribed. These sections might have been left out of the Military Code and put in an act by themselves, and the act thus constituted, and the residue of the Military Code, would have been coherent and sensible acts. . . Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. . State laws making other provisions are in conflict with it as much before as after such muster. It is also in conflict with Amendment XIV. To raise and support armies. The plaintiff in error was not a member of the organized volunteer militia of the State of Illinois, nor did he belong to the troops of the United States or to any organization under the militia law of the United States. II. For it is a settled rule "that statutes that are constitutional in part only will be upheld so far as they are not in conflict with the Constitution, provided the allowed and prohibited parts are separable." .

In the case of New York v. Miln, 11 Pet.

of the Military Code. To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper, for carrying into execution the foregoing powers," &c. Art. 35, 49; Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. It is next contended by the plaintiff in error that sections 5 and 6 of Art. It is contended that the Illinois act does not conflict with the act of Congress until the militia is actually mustered into the service of the United States.

The evidence showed no other facts. in time of peace. Mr. Lyman Trumbull also filed a supplemental brief for plaintiff in error, contending as follows: 36, 74; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper, for carrying into execution the foregoing powers," c. Art. The question is, therefore, had he a right as a citizen of the United States, in disobedience of the State law, to associate with others as a military company, and to drill and parade with arms in the towns and cities of the State? The Constitution and laws of the United States will be searched in vain for any support to the view that these rights are privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States independent of some specific legislation on the subject. After stating the facts in the language above reported, he continued: The position of the plaintiff in error in this court was, that the entire statute under which he was convicted was invalid and void, because its enactment was the exercise of a power by the legislature of Illinois forbidden to the States by the Constitution of the United States. These sections might have been left out of the Military Code and put in an act by themselves, and the act thus constituted, and the residue of the Military Code, would have been coherent and sensible acts. "A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.