Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ., joined. And it should do so because the agency’s expertise often enables a sounder assessment of which reading best fits the statutory scheme. After the Departments issued final rules, responding to post-promulgation comments but leaving the IFRs largely intact, New Jersey joined Pennsylvania’s suit. The Little Sisters “are an international congregation of Roman Catholic women religious” who have operated homes for the elderly poor in the United States since 1868. Chevron instructs that a court facing statutory ambiguity should accede to a reasonable interpretation by the implementing agency. Reg.

In the absence of such a reassessment, it seems a close call whether the moral exemption can survive. 46623 (2011). See 82 Fed. The first IFR significantly broadened the definition of an exempt religious employer to encompass an employer that “objects . well.” Id., at 731; see id., at 693 (Government properly accommodated employer’s religion-based objection to covering contraceptives under employer’s health insurance plan when the harm to women of doing so “would be precisely zero”). 47799. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 43 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).

of Health and Human Servs., 778 F. 3d 422 (CA3  2015); Priests for Life v. United States Dept. By contrast, the so-called ministerial exception of the First Amendment (which the dissent cites, see post, at 13) extends only to select employees, having ministerial status. Justice Alito, with whom Justice Gorsuch joins, concurring.

At the time, the Government thought that it might be possible to achieve this result under the ACA, ibid., but subsequent attempts to find a way to do this failed. But they failed to fulfill that commitment to women. 57578–57580; indeed, the numbers may be even higher.18 Lacking any alternative insurance coverage mechanism, see supra, at 7, the exemption leaves women two options, neither satisfactory. See supra, at 18–19. 8  Brief for Petitioners in Zubik v. Burwell, O. T. 2015, Nos. Reg.

So as applied to the Little Sisters, the dissent thinks that it would be a grave abuse if an employee wishing to obtain contraceptives had to take any step that would not be necessary if she wanted to obtain any other medical service. contraceptives . Id., at 57536, 57592.

By its terms, the ACA leaves the Guidelines’ content to the exclusive discretion of HRSA. Even assuming that the APA requires an agency to publish a document entitled “notice of proposed rulemaking” when the agency moves from an IFR to a final rule, there was no “prejudicial error” here. . Reg. The last criterion required the entity to be a church, an integrated auxiliary, a convention or association of churches, or “the exclusively religious activities of any religious order.” Ibid. Reg. Noel J. Francisco for the petitioners in 19-454. The “open-mindedness” test has no basis in the APA. See ante, at 10; n. 3, supra. §706. In 2016, the Departments attempted to strike the proper balance a third time, publishing a request for information on ways to comply with Zubik. In these consolidated cases, we decide whether the Government created lawful exemptions from a regulatory requirement implementing the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA), 124 Stat. This was error. That statute instructs that the “Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a  rule of general applicability,” unless doing so “is the least restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling governmental interest.” 42 U. S. C. §2000bb–1(a), (b). Reg. Religious nonprofit organizations and educational institutions across the country filed a spate of similar lawsuits, most resulting in rulings that the accommodation did not violate RFRA. See post, at 14, n. 16 (disclaiming the view that agencies must wait for courts to determine a RFRA violation); see also supra, at 5 (explaining that the safe harbor and commitment to developing an accommodation occurred prior to the Guidelines going into effect). of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Reg.

Second, if Congress thought that there was a compelling need to provide cost-free contraceptives for all working  women, why didn’t Congress mandate that coverage in the ACA itself? No. Brief for 186 Members of the United States Congress as Amici Curiae 6 (hereinafter Brief for 186 Members of Congress). I understand the Court’s desire to decide no more than is strictly necessary, but under the circumstances here, I would decide one additional question: whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U. S. C. §§2000bb–2000bb–4, does not compel the religious exemption granted by the current rule. . In Hobby Lobby, we found these “severe” financial consequences sufficient to show that the practical effect of non-compliance would be “substantial.”5 Id., at 720. “[E]mployers with fewer than 50 employees are not required to provide” any form of health insurance, and a number of large employers with “ ‘grandfathered’ ” plans need not comply with the contraceptive mandate. Reg. Id., at 576. . It is clear from the face of the statute that the contraceptive mandate is capable of violating RFRA. Argued.

Thus, the APA notice requirements were satisfied. ); (emphasis added).23 Counsel for the Little Sisters acknowledged as much when he conceded that religious “employers could [not] object at all” to a “government obligation” to provide contraceptive coverage “imposed directly on the insurers.” Tr.

Cf. such additional preventive care and screenings not described in paragraph (1) as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by [HRSA].” The Departments maintain, as they have since 2011, that the phrase “as provided for” allows HRSA both to identify what preventive care and screenings must be covered and to exempt or accommodate certain employers’ religious objections. Unless otherwise noted, this opinion refers to the religious and moral exemptions together as “the exemption” or “the blanket exemption.”.

The requirement that insurers cover FDA-approved methods of contraception “applies generally, . Reg. It does not, as Congress did elsewhere in the same section of the ACA, set forth any criteria or standards to guide HRSA’s selections.

8726. . Once it was apparent that the accommodation ran afoul of RFRA, the Government was required to eliminate the violation. Foundation, 454 U. S. 151, 168 (1981).

The combination of the agency practice of proceeding without notice and comment and HRSA’s discretion to alter the Guidelines, though not necessary for our analysis, provides yet another indication of Congress’ failure to provide strong protections for contraceptive coverage. The Departments “believe[d] that the  Court’s analysis in Hobby Lobby extends, for the purposes of analyzing a substantial burden, to the burdens that an entity faces when it religiously opposes participating in the [self-certification] accommodation process.” Id., at 47800. 57562–57563. The Court, while casting no doubt on the sincerity of this religious belief, explained: “Never to our knowledge has the Court interpreted the First Amendment to require the Government itself to behave in ways that the individual believes will further his or her spiritual development or that of his or her family. Ibid. of Oral Arg. The agency does so when it has not given “a satisfactory explanation for its action”—when it has failed to draw a “rational connection” between the problem it has identified and the solution it has chosen, or when its thought process reveals “a clear error of judgment.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Second, if the mandate would impose such a burden, would it nevertheless serve a “compelling interest”? It also argues that the exemptions will make it significantly harder for interested women to obtain seamless access to contraception without cost sharing, post, at 15–17, which we have previously “assume[d]” is a compelling governmental interest, Hobby Lobby, 573 U. S., at 728; but see post, at 10–12 (Alito, J., concurring).

22–26.

See 84 Fed. .

41324 (final rule explaining that “[t]he Departments believe that the definition adopted in these regulations complies with and goes beyond what is required by RFRA and Hobby Lobby”). See 82 Fed. . 28841 (2009), Congress undertook to afford gainfully employed women comprehensive, seamless, no-cost insurance coverage for preventive care protective of their health and well-being. The Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious  beliefs of particular citizens.” Id., at 699.22, Roy signals a critical distinction in the Court’s religious exercise jurisprudence: A religious adherent may be entitled to religious accommodation with regard to her own conduct, but she is not entitled to “insist that . Lastly, the final rules were published on November 15, 2018, but did not become effective until January 14, 2019—more than 30 days after being published. See 83 Fed. ; and they were published more than 30 days before they became effective, §553(d).

The first significantly expanded the church exemption to include an employer that “objects . Automobile Ins. Certainly, Congress could create such a program if it thought that providing cost-free contraceptives to all women was a matter of “paramount” concern.

After the final rules were promulgated, the State of New Jersey joined Pennsylvania’s suit and, together, they filed an amended complaint. The Court of Appeals disagreed that the self-certification accommodation substantially burdened the Little Sisters’ free exercise rights and thus rejected their RFRA claim. And respondents do not—and cannot—argue that the IFRs failed to air the relevant issues with sufficient detail for respondents to understand the Departments’ position. Reg. Congress delegated to a particular agency, the  Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), authority to designate the preventive care insurance should cover. The ACA does not explicitly exempt RFRA, and the regulations implementing the contraceptive mandate qualify as “Federal law” or “the implementation of [Federal] law” under RFRA. court filings in dozens of cases—encompassing hundreds of organizations.” Id., at 47802; see also id., at 47806. all [FDA]-approved contraceptives. Compare ante, at 16 (majority opinion) (Congress “enacted expansive language offer[ing] no indication whatever that the statute limits what HRSA can designate as preventive care and screenings or who must provide that coverage” (internal quotation marks omitted)), with post, at 9 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Nothing in [the statute] accord[s] HRSA authority” to decide “who must provide coverage” (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original)). We know from other lawsuits and public comments that many religious entities have objections to complying with the [self-certification] accommodation based on their sincerely held religious beliefs.” Id., at 47806. The Court of Appeals affirmed. See post, at 1, 21 (opinion of Ginsburg, J.). Reg. After six years of protracted litigation, the Departments  of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury (Departments)—which jointly administer the relevant ACA provision1—exempted certain employers who have religious and conscientious objections from this agency-created mandate. “(3) with respect to infants, children, and adolescents, evidence-informed preventive care and screenings provided for in the comprehensive guidelines supported by [HRSA; and], “(4) with respect to women, such additional preventive care and screenings not described in paragraph (1) as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by [HRSA] for purposes of this paragraph.”.

Thus, it was incumbent on the Departments to ensure that the rules implementing the mandate were consistent with RFRA, as interpreted in our decision. 41728.